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ABSTRACT 
As the financial crisis has tragically illustrated, the complexities of 
modern financial markets and investment securities can trigger systemic 
market failures. Addressing these complexities, this Article maintains, is 
perhaps the greatest financial-market challenge of the future. The Article 
first examines and explains the nature of these complexities. It then 
analyzes the regulatory and other steps that should be considered to 
reduce the potential for failure. Because complex financial markets 
resemble complex engineering systems, and failures in those markets have 
characteristics of failures in those systems, the Article‟s analysis draws on 
chaos theory and other approaches used to analyze complex engineering 
systems. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent article, I examined financial-market anomalies and obvious 
market and regulatory protections that failed, seeking insight into the 
subprime financial crisis and its subsequent devolution into a larger global 
financial crisis.
1
 The crisis, I argued, can be attributed in large part to three 
causes
2
: conflicts, complacency, and complexity.
3
 This Article focuses on 
 
 
 1. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage 
Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets]. This 
Article refers to these crises collectively as the ―subprime crisis.‖ Id. 
 2. Running throughout these causes is a fourth cause, cupidity; but because greed is so 
ingrained in human nature and so intertwined with the other causes, it adds little insight to view it 
separately. 
 3. Id. at 376. These causes do not fully capture the problem of systemic risk, which can arise 
from a type of tragedy of the commons; because the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources 
accrue to individual market participants, whereas the costs of exploitation, which affect the real 
economy, are distributed among an even wider class of persons, market participants have insufficient 
incentive to internalize their externalities. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 206 
(2008). Cf. Martin Hellwig, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-
Mortgage Financial Crisis 52 (Preprint of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 
Nov. 2008), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=1309442 (observing that ―given the complexity and 
the fluidity of the network of interbank relations, there is no way in which the quantitative risk model 
of an individual bank could satisfactorily take account of the institution‘s exposure to systemic risk‖); 
Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of 
Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1502 (1993) (observing that ―[g]overnment, rather 
than the private sector, has the incentive . . . to become informed about systemic risks‖). Therefore, 
even in a simple financial system with no conflicts, no complacency, and no greed, systemic risk is 
theoretically possible absent regulation to address this collective-action problem. Steven L. Schwarcz, 
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the third cause, complexity, which I regard as the greatest financial-market 
challenge of the future.
4
 
Complexity in financial markets does not necessarily ―arise for 
complexity‘s sake, nor from a desire to obfuscate.‖5 Rather, it arises in 
response to ―demand by investors for securities that meet their investment 
criteria and their appetite for ever higher yields‖6 and in order to facilitate 
the transfer and trading of risk to those who prefer to hold it, promoting 
efficiency.
7
 For example, more complex securities can offer investors the 
opportunity to gain exposure to new asset types and markets—such as 
foreign currency, commodities, or residential mortgages—in turn enabling 
them to earn higher returns and more precisely hedge risk.
8
 Complex 
securities issued by special-purpose vehicles and backed by pools of 
financial assets
9
 also enable firms to raise low-cost financing by accessing 
 
 
Keynote Address: Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549, 562 (2009) 
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Keynote Address], available at http://ssrn/abstract_id=1288687. 
 4. Cf. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 405 (concluding that ―[s]olving 
problems of financial complexity may well be the ultimate twenty-first century market goal‖). 
Although this Article focuses on financial-market complexity, a related challenge is whether the 
increasing size and complexity of financial institutions causes corporate-governance failures. My Duke 
Law School colleague, Lawrence Baxter, has separately been examining that challenge.  
 5. Peter Green & Jeremy Jennings-Mares, Letter to the Editor, FIN. TIMES, July 4, 2008, at 14. 
At the margins, however, complexity may well arise for complexity‘s sake or to obfuscate. Cf. Bruce I. 
Carlin, Strategic Price Complexity in Retail Financial Markets, 91 J. FIN. ECON. 278 (2009) (finding 
that firms sometimes make the pricing of retail financial products—such as mortgage loans, credit 
cards, and mutual funds—overly complex in order to mislead consumers into purchasing the products 
notwithstanding their higher price); Bruce Ian Carlin & Gustavo Manso, Obfuscation, Learning, and 
the Evolution of Investor Sophistication (Apr. 29, 2009) (unpublished draft, on file with author) 
(examining the relationship between obfuscation and investor sophistication); Jonathan C. Lipson, 
Failure‘s Futures: Controlling the Market for Information in Corporate Reorganization 67 (Aug. 9, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that complexity may ―breed[] opacity‖ 
that allows people to ―gain at the expense of [others]‖ rather than merely making markets efficient, and 
characterizing the trend towards inefficient complexity as the problem of ―transactional entropy‖). 
Unlike Professor Carlin‘s research, my Article addresses complexity in the context of sophisticated 
market players. In that context, even Professor Carlin would agree that the intentional obfuscation he 
discusses would be inapplicable. See Carlin & Manso, supra, at 2 (distinguishing ―experts‖ from ―non-
expert‖ consumers, and focusing only on the latter category as problematic).  
 6. Green & Jennings-Mares, supra note 5. The supply-side of this investor demand is that 
financial innovators likewise see customized financial products as a means of staying competitive, by 
―constantly introduc[ing] new financial products because [profit] margins on products decline 
quickly.‖ Hu, supra note 3, at 1479 (citations omitted). 
 7. Jennifer Bethel & Allan Ferrel, Policy Issues Raised by Structured Products, in NEW 
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CHALLENGES 167, 171 
(Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007) (explaining that structured products can promote 
efficiency in this way); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 133, 134 (1994) (explaining that by separating a corporation‘s liquid assets from its risks, 
it may obtain lower cost financing than if it were to directly issue debt or equity). 
 8. Bethel & Ferrel, supra note 7, at 173. 
 9. The term ―financial assets‖ includes any type of asset, such as accounts receivable, rental 
payments, franchise payments, loans, or other rights to payment, that over a finite period of time 
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the ultimate source of funds, the capital markets, without going through 
banks or other financial intermediaries.
10
 Complexity thus can add 
efficiency and depth to financial markets and investments. 
Nonetheless, complexity can also impair markets and investments in 
several interrelated ways. Part II.A of this Article examines how 
complexities of the assets underlying modern investment securities and the 
means of originating those assets can lead to a failure of lending standards 
and unanticipated defaults. Complexity in this sense derives from the 
intricate combining of parts, creating complications that increase the 
likelihood that failures will occur and diminish the ability of investors and 
other market participants to anticipate and avoid these failures.
11
  
Part II.B of the Article examines how complexities of the investment 
securities themselves can lead to a failure of investing standards and 
financial-market practices. Complexity in this sense derives not only from 
complication, but also from the difficulty of valuation. Senior securities, 
for instance, can carry higher credit ratings than, and can be valued above, 
the ratings and value of their underlying assets.
12
 Complexity deriving 
from complication and valuation difficulty can be thought of as cognizant 
complexity; things are just too complex to understand.
13
  
Part II.C of the Article examines how complexities of modern financial 
markets can exacerbate these failures. For example, markets consisting of 
securities that pool together multiple classes of assets can create a 
―complex system‖ in which price volatility and liquidity are nonlinear 
functions of patterns arising from the interactive behavior of many 
 
 
converts into cash. See Edward M. Iacobucci & Ralph A. Winter, Asset Securitization and Asymmetric 
Information, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 161, 162 (2005). Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (2009) (related definition of 
―Eligible Asset‖ under S.E.C. Rule 3a-7). 
 10. Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate 
Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1315 (2002) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Enron]. Capital markets are 
now the nation‘s and the world‘s most important sources of investment financing. See, e.g., 
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, MAPPING THE GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 
(2007), http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/third_annual_report/index.asp (reporting that as of 
the end of 2005, the value of total global financial assets, including equities, government and corporate 
debt securities, and bank deposits, was $140 trillion). 
 11. Cf. Merriam-Webster Online, Complex, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
complex (last visited June 5, 2008); Merriam-Webster Online, Complicated, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/complicated (last visited June 5, 2008) (defining ―complicated‖ as ―consisting 
of parts intricately combined‖ or ―difficult to analyze, understand, or explain‖). 
 12. See infra note 46. 
 13. See Schwarcz, Keynote Address, supra note 3, at 563. Social psychology uses a related term, 
―cognitive complexity,‖ to refer to different people perceiving the same phenomena on different levels 
of complexity. Some people tend to notice more and, thus, have a more nuanced view of a given 
phenomena, others notice less and, therefore, have a simplified view. See, e.g., JON E. ROECKELEIN, 
DICTIONARY OF THEORIES, LAWS, AND CONCEPTS IN PSYCHOLOGY 98–99 (1998). 
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independent and constantly adapting market participants.
14
 This not only 
can produce cognizant complexity
15
 but also a ―tight coupling‖ within 
credit markets in which events tend to move rapidly into a crisis mode 
with little time or opportunity to intervene.
16
 This additional nature of 
complexity is temporal;
17
 in a complex system, signals are sometimes 
inadvertently transmitted too quickly to control.
18
 
Finally, Part III of the Article analyzes possible solutions to these 
market failures. The failures have characteristics similar to those that 
engineers have long faced when working with complex systems that have 
nonlinear feedback effects, and indeed many characteristics of complex 
engineering systems are similar to those of financial markets.
19
 This Part, 
therefore, examines solutions inspired by chaos theory, which helps to 
inform engineers about complex systems with nonlinear feedback effects. 
Prescriptive regulation can begin to address existing market failures, 
but financial markets evolve so rapidly and often in such unexpected ways 
that prescriptive regulation can never address all potential failures. 
Prescriptive regulation also can sometimes create unintended, adverse 
consequences. Chaos theory addresses these dilemmas. Because failures 
are almost inevitable in complex systems, successful systems are those in 
which the consequences of a failure are limited. This can be done by 
decoupling systems through modularity, helping to reduce the chance that 
a failure in one part of a complex system will systemically trigger a failure 
in another part.  
 
 
 14. Cf. P.G. DRAZIN, NONLINEAR SYSTEMS 1 (1992) (observing that nonlinear systems represent 
―a feedback loop in which the output of an element is not proportional to its input‖). 
 15. Cf. Jason Kravitt, Foreword: Some Thoughts on What Has Happened to the Capital Markets 
and Securitization and Where Securitization is Going 9 (Aug. 7, 2008), http://www.pli.edu/public/ 
17984/foreword.pdf (―[T]he more complicated a system becomes, and the more interconnected, . . . the 
odds of a breakdown in a portion of the system increases (because of complexity) . . . .‖). 
 16. I thank Rick Bookstaber for introducing the term ―tight coupling,‖ originally borrowed from 
engineering nomenclature, to financial markets. See BOOKSTABER, infra note 68, at 144. Tight 
coupling is most pronounced when markets are illiquid and market participants are highly leveraged. 
 17. The effects of these types of complexity (i.e., cognizant and temporal) can combine, 
however, such as the cognizant complexity caused by the unexpected consequences of marking-to-
market, which (like a complex engineering system subject to nonlinear feedback effects) resulted in a 
downward spiral of prices when marking-to-market occurred in unstable markets. See infra notes 119–
22 and accompanying text. 
 18. Schwarcz, Keynote Address, supra note 3. Cf. W. Brian Arthur, Complexity and the 
Economy, 284 SCIENCE 107 (1999) (defining economic complexity as the tendency for patterns to 
emerge from systems, organizations, or products with many interdependent parts or actors that would 
not be predicted from classical linear economic models).  
 19. This Article is not the first to draw an analogy between financial markets and nonlinear 
engineering systems. Cf. BOOKSTABER, infra note 68 (drawing similar analogies); David A. Hsieh, 
Chaos and Nonlinear Dynamics: Application to Financial Markets, 46 J. FIN. 1839 (1991). 
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To this end, Part III examines possible solutions, including creation of 
a market liquidity provider of last resort to provide functional modularity 
by limiting the consequences of financial-market failure. The costs of such 
a market liquidity provider (which could be largely privately funded) 
should be relatively minimal, especially compared with the costs of a 
lender of last resort to financial institutions—the role played by the U.S. 
Federal Reserve and foreign central banks. Had a market liquidity provider 
of last resort been in existence when the subprime crisis started, the 
resulting collapse of the credit markets may well have been restricted in 
scope and lessened in impact. Furthermore, by stabilizing financial 
markets, a market liquidity provider of last resort could minimize the 
quandary, increasingly faced during the subprime crisis, of a lender of last 
resort being forced to lend to financial institutions deemed ―too big to 
fail.‖  
II. COMPLEXITY CAN CAUSE MARKET FAILURES 
This Part examines various ways in which complexity can cause 
market failures.  
A. Complexities of the Assets Underlying Investment Securities and of the 
Means of Originating Those Assets  
The complexities of the assets underlying investment securities, and of 
the means of originating those assets, can lead to a failure of lending 
standards and unanticipated defaults. Consider first the complexities of the 
underlying assets, which can include mortgage loans and a wide range of 
other financial assets.
20
 Each type of underlying asset requires a separate 
approach to modeling, including estimation of default risk, interest-rate 
risk, and prepayment risk (the risk that the borrower might prepay the loan 
balance at any time, thereby jeopardizing the asset‘s anticipated return on 
investment).
21
 To further complicate matters, prepayment risk is correlated 
 
 
 20. Iacobucci & Winter, supra note 9, at 162. 
 21. THOMAS S. Y. HO & SANG BIN LEE, THE OXFORD GUIDE TO FINANCIAL MODELING: 
APPLICATIONS FOR CAPITAL MARKETS, CORPORATE FINANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 348 (2004). Some assets, such as credit-card loans, are further complicated because, 
unlike mortgage loans, they have no fixed payment amount or amortization schedule. Borrowers may 
pay in full, pay a minimum payment (usually 2% of the outstanding balance), or even increase their 
balance up to a specified credit limit. Mark Furletti, An Overview of Credit Card Asset-Backed 
Securities 2 (Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Suleman Baig, CDO of ABS: A 
Primer on Performance Metrics and Test Measures 4, http://www.yieldcurve.com/mk+research/files/ 
suleman_CDOABSDec03.pdf (last visited June 12, 2008). To address these challenges, credit-card 
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with interest-rate risk: when rates fall, borrowers are more likely to 
prepay; whereas when rates rise, borrowers are more likely to default.
22
 
These risks are also dynamic in that they fluctuate over time, and 
mathematical models that attempt to estimate the dynamic correlation are, 
at best, approximations.
23
 Furthermore, as models become more 
sophisticated to take into account interest rate movements, they rely on an 
increasing number of assumptions and historical data which, if incorrect, 
will generate incorrect data.
24
 When multiple asset classes underlie a given 
class of securities, modeling can become exponentially complicated.  
In addition to complex modeling, the terms and conditions of financial 
assets can also be complex. In the subprime crisis, for example, loan 
originators made mortgage-loan products more varied and sophisticated, 
and offered these products to a wider range of borrowers, purportedly in 
order to meet market demand.
25
 These products included terms such as 
adjustable rates, low-to-zero down payment requirements, interest-only 
payment options, and negative amortization.
26
 Because of this complexity, 
some borrowers did not fully understand the risks they were incurring
27
 
and, as a result, defaulted at a much higher rate than would be predicted by 
the historical mortgage-loan default rates relied on by loan originators in 
extending credit.
28
  
 
 
securities are typically issued separately through a revolving master trust, within which several credit 
accounts are pooled together to allow for multiple bond issues as well as a revolving flow of 
receivables. Baig, supra, at 4. 
 22. MARK ADELSON, MBS BASICS 7 (2006) (describing the property of negative convexity in 
mortgage-backed securities). 
 23. HO & LEE, supra note 21, at 348–49 (discussing Monte Carlo simulations, which condition 
prepayment risk upon hypothetical interest rate fluctuations); see also Advanced Analytics, Inc. v. 
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 04 Civ. 3531 (LTS) (HBP), 2008 WL 2557421, at *1 (describing as 
―complex‖ the computerized process used to estimate prepayment risk). 
 24. ADELSON, supra note 22, at 9. 
 25. EDWARD VINCENT MURPHY, ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGES: RISKS TO CONSUMERS AND 
LENDERS IN THE CURRENT HOUSING CYCLE, CRS REPORT 5–6 (2006), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/ 
RL33775_20061227.pdf. 
 26. Id. at 2–3. 
 27. Patricia A. McCoy & Elizabeth Renuart, The Legal Infrastructure of Subprime and 
Nontraditional Home Mortgages 19 (2008), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/ 
understanding_consumer_credit/papers/ucc08-5_mccoy_renuart.pdf. 
 28. Edward Golding, Richard K. Green & Douglas A. McManus, Imperfect Information and the 
Housing Finance Crisis 16 (2008), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/understanding_ 
consumer_credit/papers/ucc08-6_golding_green_mcmanus.pdf (last visited July 21, 2008); see also 
Subprime Mortgage Market Turmoil: Examining the Role of Securitization: Hearing Before the S. 
Banking, Hous., and Urban Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Invs., 110th Cong. 4 (2007) (statement of 
Kurt Eggert, Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law), available at http://banking. 
senate.gov/public/_files/eggert.pdf. 
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The complexities of the means of originating these assets also can lead 
to a failure of lending standards. For example, the originate-to-distribute 
model of mortgage lending,
29
 under which mortgage lenders would sell off 
loans as they were made,
30
 is believed to have contributed to the subprime 
crisis.
31
 Third parties—including government-sponsored enterprises such 
as Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), direct government 
entities such as the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie 
Mae), and private investment banks—would purchase the loans and 
package them into mortgage-backed securities, or ―MBS.‖32 This 
―securitization‖ process increased the accessibility and affordability of 
mortgage lending by indirectly funding such lending through the capital 
markets.
33
 Nonetheless, because the interests of the lenders were no longer 
aligned with the interests of the owners of the loans (the investors in the 
MBS effectively becoming owners of the loans), there is concern that the 
originate-to-distribute model fostered moral hazard on the part of the 
lenders,
34
 resulting in lax lending standards.
35
 
 
 
 29. This model is also referred to as ―originate-and-distribute.‖ 
 30. Unlike lending practices common several decades ago, today mortgages are most often sold 
to third parties shortly after being written: thus, originated and then distributed. Richard J. Rosen, The 
Role of Securitization in Mortgage Lending, CHI. FED. LETTER (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, 
Chicago, Ill., Nov. 2007).  
 31. See, e.g., Gary B. Gorton, The Panic of 2007 68 (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 14358, 2008) (stating that the originate-to-distribute model is the ―dominant explanation‖ 
for the financial panic). But cf. Efraim Benmelech, Jennifer Dlugosz & Victoria Ivashina, What Lies 
Beneath: Is There Adverse Selection in CLO Collateral?, http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1344068 
(finding, empirically, that bank loans that are securitized perform no worse than bank loans that are 
held).  
 32. See Gorton, supra note 31, at 68. 
 33. Id. The capital markets are ―markets where capital funds—debt and equity—are traded. 
Included are private placement sources of debt and equity as well as organized markets and 
exchanges.‖ JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND 
INVESTMENT TERMS 59 (3d ed. 1991). 
 34. ―Moral hazard‖ means, in this context, the greater tendency of people who are protected from 
the consequences of risky behavior to engage in such behavior. See, e.g., Charles G. Hallinan, The 
“Fresh Start” Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 
U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 84 (1986). 
 35. Martin Feldstein, Op-Ed., How to Stop the Mortgage Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2008, at 
A15 (describing lax lending standards that gave rise to mortgages with loan-to-value ratios of nearly 
100%, and citing the 1.8 million mortgages then in default); David Henry & Matthew Goldstein, The 
Bear Flu: How it Spread, BUS. WK., Dec. 31, 2007, at 30 (arguing that the distance between mortgage-
loan originators and the ultimate holders of the loans encouraged lax lending). Cf. John C. Dugan, 
Comptroller of Currency, Speech Given at the Annual Convention of The American Bankers 
Association 5 (Oct. 8, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2007-
109a.pdf) (observing that with the increasing use of the originate-to-distribute model of lending, 
lending standards shifted from evaluating the likelihood of repayment to evaluating the likelihood that 
the loan could be sold); The Big Picture, http://bigpicture.typepad.com/comments/2008/10/why-
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An important question here is why the ultimate owners of the loans—
the distributees, which in the subprime crisis were the parties buying the 
mortgage-backed securities
36—did not impose on the originator the same 
strict lending standards that they would otherwise observe but for the 
separation of origination and ownership.
37
 There appear to be several 
answers, with ramifications beyond the subprime crisis. First, by 
separating the ultimate owners of the mortgage loans from the actual 
lenders, an originate-to-distribute model makes it difficult for those 
owners to always see the big picture.
38
 Like the fable of a blind person 
describing an elephant by touching only a part,
39
 owners often focused on 
isolated aspects of the market. Separating the ultimate owners also can 
create a collective-action problem when those owners are widely 
dispersed.
40
 This occurred in the subprime crisis through the securitization 
of subprime mortgage loans, making it difficult for owners to agree on 
underlying lending standards as well as making it difficult to agree on loan 
monitoring, or ―servicing,‖ standards.41 Furthermore, to the extent an 
originate-to-distribute model reduces the size of any given owner‘s 
investment below an amount sufficient to motivate the owner to engage in 
due diligence and monitoring, it could induce undue reliance on rating-
agency ratings.
42
 
The foregoing discussion focused on complexities of the assets 
underlying modern securities and the means of originating those assets. 
 
 
lending-sta.html (Oct. 21, 2008, 07:21 EST) (arguing that originators tried to find borrowers who 
could afford the low ―teaser‖ rates for a few months, which led to the implosion of 293 mortgage 
lenders). 
 36. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 30 (describing the process of mortgage securitization as the sale 
of loans to an investor who might hold them or repackage loans into securities—which may in turn be 
sold or again repackaged—such that the ultimate mortgage owner is several steps removed from the 
borrower). 
 37. Most investors in securities are sophisticated institutions. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM‘N, STAFF 
REPORT: ENHANCING DISCLOSURE IN THE MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES MARKETS (2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/mortgagebacked.htm (reporting that investors in 
mortgage-backed securities are ―overwhelmingly institutional‖). 
 38. See, e.g., Dugan, supra note 35, at 6 (arguing that investors were unable to fully understand 
the complicated securities they bought); Telephone Interview with Alan Hirsch, Director, N.C. Policy 
Office (Feb. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Hirsch] (observing that the originate-to-distribute model made the 
structure ―so complex that no one followed the trail‖). 
 39. See JOHN GODFREY SAXE, THE POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN GODFREY SAXE 111–12 (Boston, 
Houghton, Mifflin, & Co. 1882) (the poem, ―The Blindmen and the Elephant,‖ based on a South Asian 
parable). 
 40. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 390–91. 
 41. Id.; see also Feldstein, supra note 35, at A15 (explaining that the separation of borrowers 
from the ultimate owners of mortgages frustrated the ability to effectively service or renegotiate 
troubled loans). 
 42. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
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The next discussion focuses on complexities of the securities backed by 
these assets.  
B. Complexities of Modern Investment Securities  
The complexities of modern investment securities can lead to a failure 
of investing standards and financial-market practices for several reasons: 
these complexities impair disclosure; they obscure the ability of market 
participants to see and judge consequences; and they make financial 
markets more susceptible to financial contagion and also more susceptible 
to fraud.  
To provide perspective, the subprime crisis involved complex forms of 
mortgage-backed securities. In their simplest form, these securities are 
typically issued through special-purpose vehicles (SPVs, sometimes called 
special-purpose entities, or SPEs), and payment on such securities derive 
principally or entirely from the mortgage loans owned by the SPVs. More 
complex forms of MBS include CDO, or ―collateralized debt 
obligation,‖43 securities backed by—and, thus, whose payment derives 
principally or entirely from—a mixed pool of mortgage loans and other 
financial assets owned by SPVs;
44
 and ABS CDO securities backed by a 
mixed pool of mortgage- and other asset-backed securities. The classes, or 
―tranches,‖ of these securities are typically ranked by seniority of payment 
priority, with the highest priority classes being called ―senior securities,‖ 
lower priority classes usually being called ―mezzanine securities,‖ and the 
lowest priority class, which has a residual claim against the SPV, being 
called the ―equity.‖45 The senior and many of the subordinated classes of 
these securities are more highly rated than the quality of the underlying 
mortgage loans.
46
  
 
 
 43. There are even more arcane variations, such as CDOs ―squared‖ or ―cubed,‖ but they go 
beyond this Article‘s analysis. 
 44. Securities backed by assets other than mortgage loans are sometimes referred to in the 
securitization industry as ―asset-backed securities‖ or ―ABS.‖ This Article will use the term asset-
backed securities to generically mean securities backed by any types of assets, including mortgage 
loans. 
 45. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 376–78. 
 46. For example, senior securities issued in a CDO transaction are usually rated AAA even if the 
underlying income-generating assets consist of subprime mortgages, and senior securities issued in an 
ABS CDO transaction are usually rated AAA even if none of the underlying securities supporting the 
transaction are rated that high. This is accomplished by allocating cash collections first to pay the 
senior classes and thereafter to pay more junior classes. In this way, the senior classes are highly 
overcollateralized to take into account the possibility, indeed likelihood, of delays and losses on 
collection. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 378. 
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Huge segments of modern finance in the United States and abroad 
continue to operate in similar ways, involving the complex issuance by 
SPVs of securities backed by a wide range of financial assets (such 
securities generally known as ―asset-backed securities,‖ and the process of 
creating and issuing asset-backed securities generally known as 
―securitization‖47). The potential of these complexities to impair 
disclosure, to obscure the ability of market participants to see and judge 
consequences, and to make financial markets more susceptible to financial 
contagion and fraud therefore goes beyond mortgage-backed securities and 
the subprime crisis. 
Complexities of Securities Can Impair Disclosure. Complexity can 
deprive investors and other market participants of the understanding 
needed for markets to operate effectively.
48
 Even if all information about a 
complex structure is disclosed,
49
 complexity increases the amount of 
information that must be analyzed in order to value the investment with a 
degree of certainty. This additional analysis entails higher cost.
50
 
According to rational ignorance theory, there is a point at which the 
benefit obtained from additional analysis can be outweighed, or at least 
appear to be outweighed, by the costs of performing that analysis.
51
 In the 
context of securities markets, this means that firms deciding whether to 
allocate more analyst time or hire additional experts to analyze possible 
 
 
 47. Securitization generally means the process of turning financial assets into securities issued by 
an SPV. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, supra note 7, at 135; see also STEVEN L. 
SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION § 1:1, at 
1–2 (3d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2006) [hereinafter SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE] (discussing 
securitization as a dominant means of financing in the United States and abroad). 
 48. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of 
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm]. 
 49. Cf. Malcolm Gladwell, Open Secrets: Enron, Intelligence, and the Perils of Too Much 
Information, NEW YORKER, Jan. 8, 2007, at 44 (distinguishing between transactions that are merely 
―puzzles‖ and those that are truly ―mysteries‖). To the extent complexity is merely a puzzle, 
investment bankers theoretically could understand it. In practice, though, ―[m]any investors do not 
possess the resources to fully analyze complicated structured products.‖ Kravitt, supra note 15, at 18. 
 50. See Anuj K. Shah & Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Heuristics Made Easy: An Effort-Reduction 
Framework, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 207, 207 (2008) (describing costs of information analysis as 
identification of relevant data, storing of that data, assessing the weight of each piece of data, 
integrating alternative sources of data, and parsing or analyzing the data to produce actionable 
information). 
 51. Community Leader‘s Letter, Econ. Brief No. 29, The Theory of Rational Ignorance, 
http://www.strom.clemson.edu/teams/ced/econ/8-3No29.pdf; see also Schwarcz, Rethinking the 
Disclosure Paradigm, supra note 48, at 13–15 (explaining why institutional investors face declining 
incentives to hire experts to parse information relating to structured products as those products 
increase in complexity). 
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investments might view the added tangible costs as outweighing the 
uncertain gain.
52
 
Prior to the subprime crisis, for example, except for anticipating quite 
how profoundly home prices would drop, virtually all of the risks giving 
rise to the collapse of the market for securities backed by subprime 
mortgages appear to have been disclosed.
53
 Investors did not, however, 
always appreciate these risks, in large part because the complexity of these 
securities made the risks very difficult to understand.
54
 The prospectus 
itself in a typical offering of these securities can be hundreds of pages 
long.
55
 Searching through this vast volume of ―information‖ is to some 
extent akin to the difficulty that would be posed by searching the Internet 
without a search engine to systematically filter through and organize 
results.  
Investment analysts thus often resort to simplifying heuristics, such as 
credit ratings, as substitutes for attempting to fully understand the 
investments being analyzed.
56
 In the subprime crisis, for example, ―A lot 
of institutional investors bought securities substantially based on their 
ratings [without fully understanding what they bought], in part because the 
market has become so complex.‖57  
 
 
 52. Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure‟s Failure in the Subprime Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 
1114 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Disclosure‟s Failure]. 
 53. But cf. Mark Adelson & David Jacob, Adelson & Jacob Consulting, ABS/MBS Litigation 
Outlook, Nov. 19, 2007, http://adelsonandjacob.com/pubs/Litigation_Outlook.pdf (arguing that 
―disclosure materials generally did not highlight the [aggressive marketing of] stated-income loans to 
W-2 wage earners . . . . [T]he changing character of the stated-income loans (i.e., more wage earners) 
generally was not [disclosed]. . . . Issuers routinely disclosed that they allowed exceptions to their 
subprime mortgage underwriting criteria. However, they did not generally indicate whether the 
prevalence of these exceptions was increasing during the relevant period.‖). 
 54. COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POLICY GROUP III, CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISK: THE ROAD 
TO REFORM 53 (2008) [hereinafter CRMPG III REPORT] (―[T]here is almost universal agreement that, 
even with optimal disclosure in the underlying documentation, the characteristics of [several classes of 
securities] were not fully understood by many [large integrated financial intermediaries, hedge funds, 
specialized financial institutions, and other] market participants.‖). 
 55. The disclosure documents ordinarily consist of a prospectus and a prospectus supplement, 
each close to 200 pages long. Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure‟s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1110.  
 56. Investment managers who are compensated by the number or amount of securities 
recommended for investment may be especially tempted to do this, particularly if the securities being 
recommended are of a type that others are recommending. Schwarcz, Disclosure‟s Failure, supra note 
52, at 1115. Cf. Shah & Oppenheimer, supra note 50, at 207 (explaining results of behavioral 
psychology experiment demonstrating that individuals increasingly employ heuristics to reduce the 
cost of analysis when time pressures or opportunity costs are high). 
 57. Aaron Lucchetti & Serena Ng, Credit and Blame: How Rating Firms‟ Calls Fueled Subprime 
Mess, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2007, at A1 (quoting a market observer); see also Alan S. Blinder, Six 
Fingers of Blame in the Mortgage Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, at B4 (arguing that mortgage-
backed securities, especially CDO securities, ―were probably too complex for anyone‘s good‖); Aaron 
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Although the use of heuristics might be efficient overall in certain 
applications, heuristic reasoning can sometimes expose analysis to bias 
and systematic error.
58
 In the context of securities disclosure, exclusive 
reliance on ratings ignores the additional information that is essential to a 
truly competitive market in financial information.
59
 
Complexities of Securities Can Obfuscate Consequences. When 
securities are highly complex, parties reviewing, or even structuring, the 
securities may not always appreciate all the consequences.
60
 In the 
subprime crisis, for example, although ABS CDO transactions were 
backed by what appeared to be significantly diverse securities, there was 
an ―underlying correlation in the subprime mortgage loans backing‖ many 
of those securities.
61
 Not even rating agencies saw this correlation.
62
 
Although, in retrospect, one may say the correlation should have been 
realized, hidden correlations are only observable when there is full 
appreciation of the underlying variables.
63
  
For example, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, investors failed to 
recognize an underlying correlation between mobile-home loans and the 
price of oil. An oil boom in Oklahoma drew an influx of oil workers, 
 
 
Lucchetti, Kara Scannell & Craig Karmin, SEC Aims to Rein In the Role of Ratings, WALL ST. J., June 
24, 2008, at C1 (―The dirty secret of some bond investors is that they simply bought securities with the 
highest yield for a given rating, which is why they snapped up complicated securities tied to subprime 
mortgages.‖).  
 58. M. GRANGER MORGAN & MAX HENRION, UNCERTAINTY: A GUIDE TO DEALING WITH 
UNCERTAINTY IN QUANTITATIVE RISK AND POLICY ANALYSIS 102 (1990); Christine Jolls, Cass R. 
Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 
1777 (1998). 
 59. Cf. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 
DUKE L.J. 711, 714 (2006) (arguing that a precise understanding of financial-market investments is 
essential to a truly competitive market). 
 60. Cf. Hu, supra note 3, at 1480 (observing in a derivatives context that ―[t]he complexity can 
overwhelm even experts‖). A related concern arises to the extent securities become so highly complex 
that, as Professor Kenneth Klee has suggested, parties sometimes have difficulty understanding their 
documentation. Kenneth Klee, Remarks at the International Insolvency Institute‘s Eighth Annual 
International Insolvency Conference (June 10, 2008) (notes on file with author).  
 61. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 403. 
 62. Id. Rating agencies make their business in carefully assessing the creditworthiness of 
investment securities. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The 
Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 6 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public 
Markets].  
 63. The limitations of cognitive complexity may help to explain the inability of even financial 
analysts and other ―experts‖ to see these correlations. Recall that different people perceive the same 
phenomena on different levels of complexity. See supra note 13. As the complexity of financial 
products increased, fewer analysts possessed sufficiently nuanced cognition to properly understand 
and price the products. Trying to do their jobs, many analysts made oversimplifications usually on the 
optimistic side because the economy was expanding. To some extent, these simplifications involved 
overreliance on heuristics. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.  
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creating the nation‘s fastest growing market for mobile-home loans. When 
oil prices crashed, drilling in Oklahoma ceased, resulting in massive 
unemployment and causing widespread defaults on the mobile-home 
loans.
64
 
The loan servicing problem likewise results from the complexity of 
securities obfuscating consequences.
65
 Parties did not anticipate that the 
separate allocation of cash flows deriving from principal and interest to 
different investor tranches of mortgage-backed securities would lead, in a 
default scenario, to conflicts among investors. That, in turn, made 
servicers reluctant to exercise the discretionary judgment needed to 
restructure the underlying mortgage loans—since exercising any discretion 
might expose servicers to liability.
66
  
The complexities of securities also can obfuscate consequences when 
payoffs on the securities are linked to unrelated events. Due to 
nonlinearity found in complex systems, small events can cause seemingly 
unrelated catastrophes as when a simple clogged pressure-release valve 
escalated into a meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor.
67
 
Similarly in financial markets, consequences can be obfuscated when, for 
example, options or other derivative instruments have payoffs that are not 
linearly related to the prices of their underlying securities, so that 
information on day-to-day market movements cannot be used to predict 
the payoff if the market moves dramatically.
68
 
Finally, the complexities of securities can obfuscate consequences 
when trying to assess investment risk. Investment analysts may well be 
able to intuit this risk, but—with limited time available to devote to risk 
assessment—a firm‘s senior managers often want risk to be modeled and 
reduced to useable numbers.
69
 Any model, however, can be manipulated. 
For example, VaR, or value-at-risk, is presently the most widely used 
model for reducing investment risk to a number.
70
 As the VaR model 
became more accepted, banks began compensating analysts not only for 
 
 
 64. Paul Bennett, NYSE Group, Effective Monetary Policy in the U.S. and Emerging Markets, 
Istanbul Bilgi University 5–8 (Sept. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing 
that ―factors‖ that remain unchanged for long periods can obscure correlation). 
 65. See infra notes 271–74 and accompanying text. 
 66. See infra note 274 and accompanying text (discussing ―tranche warfare‖). 
 67. Richard Bookstaber, The Myth of Non Correlation, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 2007, at 
82, 82. 
 68. RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND 
THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 156 (2007). My work in this Article is inspired in part by this 
excellent book.  
 69. Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, § 6 (Magazine), at 24. 
 70. Id. at 26. 
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generating profits but also for generating profits with low risks, measured 
by VaR.
71
 Analysts therefore began to refocus investment portfolios to 
concentrate more on securities (such as MBS and credit-defaults swaps) 
that generate gains but only rarely have losses.
72
 Because the likelihood of 
these losses was less than the risk percentages taken into account under 
VaR modeling—which typically excludes losses that have less than a one-
percent (or, in some cases, five-percent) likelihood of occurring within the 
model‘s limited time frame—such losses were not included in the VaR 
computations.
73
 Analysts knew but did not always make clear to senior 
management that in the rare cases where such losses occurred, they would 
be huge.
74
 
Complexities of Securities Can Make Financial Markets More 
Susceptible to Financial Contagion. The complexities of securities can 
make financial markets more susceptible to financial contagion. In the 
subprime crisis, the complexities of securities made it easier for problems 
with subprime mortgage-backed securities to quickly infect the 
securitization and other credit markets generally. Investors did not always 
understand how CDO and ABS CDO securities worked, and therefore 
were prone to rely, in their investment decisions, on the fact that tranches 
of those securities were rated ―investment grade‖ by such top rating 
agencies as Standard & Poor‘s, Moody‘s, and Fitch.75 When those 
investment-grade tranches later lost money,
76
 the resulting uncertainty 
caused investors to panic, fearing that other highly-rated securities could 
likewise default.
77
  
 
 
 71. Id. at 46. 
 72. Id. For an explanation of credit-default swaps, see infra notes 130–33 and accompanying 
text. 
 73. Nocera, supra note 69, at 46. It is ironic that the VaR model explicitly excludes low 
probability events without regard to consequences of the events occurring, given Professor Hu‘s 
observation that ignoring such ―threshold effects‖ is not always economically rational. Hu, supra note 
3, at 1488.  
 74. Nocera, supra note 69, at 46. 
 75. Investment grade technically means a rating of BBB- or better. Schwarcz, Private Ordering 
of Public Markets, supra note 62, at 7. An investment-grade rating indicates that full and timely 
repayment on the securities should not be speculative. See id. at 7–8. 
 76. See, e.g., Carrick Mollenkamp & Serena Ng, Wall Street Wizardry Amplified Credit Crisis, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2007, at A1 (reporting on the downgrade of one CDO‘s AAA rated tranches to 
junk status). 
 77. See, e.g., Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Preventing a Panic, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 11, 
2008, at 63–64 (arguing that ―the credit system has been virtually frozen‖ because ―few people even 
know where the liabilities and losses are concentrated‖). In economic terms, this can be seen as a 
variant on adverse selection. Cf. Edward L. Glaeser & Hédi D. Kallal, Thin Markets, Asymmetric 
Information, and Mortgage-Backed Securities, J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION, Jan. 1997, at 64–65 
(describing a common adverse selection problem within mortgage-backed securities: that issuers of 
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The complexities of securities also can make market problems more 
contagious. In the subprime crisis, for example, payment on many 
mortgage-backed securities was guaranteed by ―monoline‖ insurers, or 
specialized financial insurance companies that guarantee principal and 
interest payments to investors on certain structured-finance and municipal 
securities. Monoline insurers traditionally have been thinly capitalized, the 
justification being that they use statistical models to stress-test every 
potential scenario and insure only securities that pass these tests.
78
 In the 
subprime crisis, however, monolines did not always adequately stress-test 
for the scenario of rapidly falling house prices; as a result, they were 
weakened by having to make payments on defaulting securities far 
exceeding their projections. This caused some monolines to lose their 
rating-agency required capital cushions and, thus, their AAA ratings, 
which in turn caused many monoline-guaranteed securities to lose their 
ratings.
79
 Because of uncertainty as to which securities were guaranteed by 
monolines and the inherent complexity of the monoline statistical rating 
scheme, some investors avoided any type of securities that were 
customarily guaranteed by monolines, even those with fundamental 
underlying strength.
80
  
This is well exemplified by the resulting crisis in the auction-rate-note 
(ARN) market. ARNs are long-term debt securities with short-term 
resetting interest rates issued by municipalities, museums, schools, and 
similar entities.
81
 Many ARNs are guaranteed by monoline insurers.
82
 In 
February 2008, however, investors were able to find few buyers for their 
notes because potential buyers feared that the monolines, which also were 
 
 
mortgage-backed securities have greater familiarity with the product and special information regarding 
its quality); George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970) (describing the agency costs that arise in the common 
situation where sellers have better information regarding the quality of a good than the buyers; and 
discussing that when buyers use some statistic or rating to judge quality, overall quality for goods 
might decline as the benefits of quality accrue to the statistical group rather than an individual seller). 
 78. A Monoline Meltdown?, ECONOMIST, July 28, 2007, at 77. 
 79. David Enrich & Peter Eavis, More Subprime Pain in Store—UBS Write-Downs, Insurer 
Downgrades Point to More Unraveling, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2008, at C2. 
 80. Aline Van Duyn & Gillian Tett, Markets Assess the Costs of a Monoline Meltdown, FIN. 
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8d715b9e-dfe9-11dc-8073-0000779fd2ac.html. 
 81. Liz Rappaport & Kara Scannell, Auction-Rate Turmoil Draws Watchdogs‟ Scrutiny, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 22, 2008, at C2. 
 82. The State of the Bond Insurance Industry: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital 
Mkts., Ins., and Gov‟t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 39 (2008) 
(statement of Erik R. Sirri, Director, Division of Trading and Markets, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission). 
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insuring large amounts of securities backed by subprime mortgages, would 
default. Buyers started avoiding all ARNs, even those of strong issuers.
83
  
The complexities of securities also can contribute to contagion insofar 
as securities are so specialized and sophisticated that they have no actual 
or active trading market. Absent market valuation, these securities are 
typically valued by using highly complex mathematical models, a 
valuation procedure sometimes called ―marking to model.‖84 Like all 
mathematical models, the models for valuing securities are based on 
assumptions.
85
 If these assumptions turn out to be wrong, investors may 
lose confidence in the securities. This occurred, for example, in the 
subprime crisis where the assumptions underlying mark-to-model 
valuation of CDO and ABS CDO securities turned out to be wrong, 
triggering panic among investors who did not (and, in the absence of a 
trading market or a reliable model, could not) know what those securities 
were worth.
86
  
Complexities of Securities Can Make Financial Markets More 
Susceptible to Fraud. Complexity also can facilitate fraud, especially in 
the case of complex asset-backed securities transactions.
87
 To understand 
why, compare asset-backed securities with ordinary corporate debt 
securities, like bonds. When a company issues bonds, investors purchase 
the bonds based on the company‘s ability to repay, which turns on the 
company‘s public reputation for financial integrity and governance.88 
Although there certainly have been frauds—like Parmalat, WorldCom, 
 
 
 83. See, e.g., Ted Phillips, Moody‟s Warns of Negative Impacts from Auction-Rate Securities, 
THE BOND BUYER, Feb. 21, 2008, at 4 (observing that failed auctions are ―occurring in spite of the fact 
that the underlying credit quality of issuers remains strong‖). 
 84. Neil Shah, Can Wall Street be Trusted to Value Risky CDOs?, REUTERS, July 14, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSN0929430320070714. 
 85. Id. (detailing comments by M.I.T. Finance Professor Andrew Lo explaining that models used 
to value illiquid assets can ―[break] down rather dramatically during abnormal times‖ because the 
assumptions underlying the models fail). 
 86. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Reading Write-Down Tea Leaves, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at C1 
(discussing the problems related to using valuation models). See generally Ingo Fender & John Kiff, 
CDO Rating Methodology: Some Thoughts on Model Risk and Its Implications (Bank for International 
Settlements, Working Paper No. 163, 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work163.htm 
(discussing the problems associated with the valuation models used by rating agencies). 
 87. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (defining asset-backed securities). 
 88. Cf. Hollis Ashbaugh-Skaife, Daniel W. Collins & Ryan LaFond, The Effects of Corporate 
Governance on Firms‟ Credit Ratings, 42 J. ACCT. & ECON. 203, 238 (2006) (finding that weak 
corporate governance results in poorer credit ratings); TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, THE INT‘L ORG. OF 
SECS. COMM‘NS, THE ROLE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS: FINAL 
REPORT 4 (2008), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD270.pdf (finding that credit 
rating agencies examine a firm‘s financial stability in determining the likelihood an issued security 
would be repaid). 
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and Global Crossing—where the reality belied the company‘s reputation,89 
reputation built up slowly is harder to fake. For example, a corporation‘s 
reputation for financial integrity is derived from actual earnings as 
reported through financial statements and corroborated by independent 
certified public accountants.
90
 With increased personal responsibility 
placed on corporate managers by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it is difficult—
at least for public companies—to feign financial integrity.91 A 
corporation‘s reputation for governance derives from the quality of 
management, which is tested and built up over time by individual 
managers.
92
 When companies lack a good public reputation, they find it 
difficult if not impossible to issue bonds in the capital markets.
93
  
The use of asset-backed securities, however, enables even companies 
without good public reputations to obtain capital-market financing 
indirectly by using their financial assets. Because asset-backed securities 
transactions are designed to withstand even a bankruptcy of the company, 
investors rely less on the company‘s reputation and much more on the 
ability of the financial assets originated by the company to repay the 
securities.
94
 Therefore, much is done to monitor those assets.
95
  
 
 
 89. Cf. David Simons, WorldCom‟s Convincing Lies, FORBES, July 8, 2002, http://www.forbes. 
com/2002/07/08/0708simons.html (discussing the fraudulent public reputation built by WorldCom that 
allowed it to sell bonds that were not based on the real value and reputation of the company). 
 90. Further, even the quality reputation of the auditing firm that verifies financial statements is 
widely believed to influence litigation exposure and the cost of raising capital. Inder K. Khurana & K. 
K. Raman, Litigation Risk and the Financial Reporting Credibility of Big 4 Versus Non-Big 4 Audits: 
Evidence from Anglo-American Countries, 79 ACCT. R. 473, 474 (2004). 
 91. Among other things, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires corporate officers and similar 
managers to certify the accuracy and completeness of each annual report, and to certify that internal 
controls are in place such that managers and auditors are apprised of material information relating to 
the issuer and its subsidiaries. 69 AM. JUR. 2d Securities Regulation § 454 (2008). 
 92. David Hirshleifer, Managerial Reputation and Corporate Investment Decisions, 22 FIN. 
MGMT. 145, 146 (1993) (explaining that investor beliefs about manager and firm reputation influence 
the cost of raising capital, recruiting employees, and marketing products). 
 93. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (because many investors are limited to only bonds 
that carry investment-grade ratings, a poor reputation that results in poor credit ratings will restrict a 
firm‘s access to capital). 
 94. See SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 47, § 3:1. 
 95. Query the extent to which the acceptability of this monitoring derived from traditional asset-
backed (sometimes called asset-based) finance. To that extent, there may be a disconnect because 
traditional asset-backed finance dealt with collateral for loans, but the company was still important 
because if it went bankrupt there would be an automatic stay and other bad consequences for the asset-
backed lender. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425, 455–58 (1997) (discussing how bankruptcy impacts secured creditors). 
These same monitoring techniques may have carried over into bankruptcy-remote asset-backed 
securities transactions, such as securitization. 
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For example, under existing best-practice standards for monitoring,
96
 
one or more of the underwriters, trustees (or similar agents acting on 
behalf of the investors), and servicers of the asset-backed securities 
(hereinafter referred to as the ―due-diligence parties‖) will engage in the 
following due diligence procedures.
97
  
Before the asset-backed securities transaction is actually closed, the 
due-diligence parties typically review audited financial statements of the 
company certified as complying with generally accepted accounting 
standards. They also typically visit the company‘s offices to meet with 
management and to discuss applicable servicing practices, collections 
practices, and credit underwriting practices for the financial assets. The 
due-diligence parties then review data provided by the company 
examining, among other things, a random sampling of the actual 
underlying financial-asset files.
98
 They will then contact the obligors listed 
in the files to confirm the existence of those financial assets. Additionally, 
they will review the company‘s reports of the historical and anticipated 
default rates on the underlying financial assets and try to ascertain that 
these rates are generally within the range of rates reported publicly for 
defaults on these types of financial assets.
99
  
On an ongoing basis after the transaction closes, the servicer will 
prepare periodic, usually monthly, servicer reports on the continuing 
performance of the financial assets. This report typically includes data 
 
 
 96. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)–77(b) (2006) (the ―Securities Act‖), imposes 
on underwriters civil liability for misstatements or omissions in the registration statement. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77k(a)(5). The statutory standard to establish due diligence defense is ―that required of a prudent 
man in the management of his own property.‖ 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c). The statutory standard was further 
elaborated by the SEC in Rule 176 (a multifactor test). 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (2009). Escott v. BarChris 
Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), is the leading case on due diligence defense. 
See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, The Due Diligence Defense Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 
1933, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 549, 549 (2006). 
 97. Sometimes, the due-diligence parties themselves look to independent third-party industry 
experts to perform a portion of this diligence on their behalf. See, e.g., Robert W. Doty, Issuer Due 
Diligence—Relying on Experts & Third Party Information, Presentation to California Debt & 
Investment Advisory Commission, 6th Annual Pre-Conference (Sept. 10, 2007), available at 
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/Cdiac/seminars/slides/20070910/doty.pdf. 
 98. It is usual to review only a random sampling where, as is customary, there are numerous 
small financial assets. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street 
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2083 n.214 (2007) (quoting Bill Shepherd, 
Perils and Phantasm: The Mortgage Securitization Boom Is Threatened by Recession, Legislation and 
Rate Change, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG., Feb. 3, 2003, at 4 (―When subprime RMBS [residential 
mortgage-backed securities] underwriters examine loan files manually, normally they ‗don‘t do due 
diligence on every single loan in a pool; at most, they do a random sample of, say, 3% of the loans.‘‖). 
 99. See, e.g., Bulletin from Kathryn E. Dick, Director, Treasury and Market Risk Division, 
Office of the Comptroller of Currency, Unsafe and Unsound Investment Portfolio Practices (May 22, 
2002), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/2002-19.txt.  
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regarding payments received on the financial assets, principal amounts that 
had defaulted, and the status of various reserves. Because the company 
itself or one of its affiliates usually acts as the servicer,
100
 the servicer 
report will be reviewed by one or more independent due-diligence parties 
(usually the trustee) who may even try to verify certain data such as 
checking payment receipts on the financial assets against what is being 
reported as collected. To the extent there are any problems in performance 
of the financial assets or discrepancies between reported and actual data, 
the company will be contacted to understand why. Significant problems or 
discrepancies usually will trigger a termination of the transaction.
101
  
These due-diligence procedures are formidable but, for two reasons, 
they are not foolproof: they do not micromanage all uses and sources of 
cash, and (as mentioned) the servicer is not usually independent of the 
company.
102
 In the recent Student Finance Corporation (―SFC‖) fraud, for 
example, to disguise very high default rates on financial assets consisting 
of tuition-payment loans, SFC itself made payments on those loans from 
the proceeds of new securitization transactions—in effect, engaging in an 
undisclosed Ponzi scheme.
103
 All of the due-diligence procedures 
described above had been performed, yet the fraud remained undiscovered 
for years.
104
 In another recent fraud where (again) these due-diligence 
procedures had been performed, the company is alleged to have misled the 
due-diligence parties and investors by depositing money into the collection 
account on the monthly date that collections were actually tested and then 
withdrawing the money the day after.
105
 Existing best-practice monitoring 
standards thus imperfectly protect investors from fraud. 
The foregoing discussion has focused on failures resulting from the 
complexities of modern securities and their underlying assets. This Article 
next discusses how the complexities of modern financial markets 
themselves can exacerbate these failures.  
 
 
 100. Cf. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 47, § 4:5, at 4–10 (Schwarcz observes 
that companies usually perform their own servicing in asset-backed securities transactions due to the 
cost of delegating servicing responsibility.). 
 101. See, e.g., DEBORAH R. SEIFE ET AL., FITCH RATINGS, ASSET-BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER 
EXPLAINED 10 (2001), www.stern.nyu.edu/~igiddy/ABS/fitchabcp.pdf (explaining ―transaction-
specific‖ wind-down triggers, including breach of representation by a seller or servicer and 
deterioration of portfolio assets). 
 102. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
 103. In re Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. Equip. Lease Litig., No. 1:02CV16000, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21392 at *31–32 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 20, 2006) (citing MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 286 
F. Supp. 2d 347, 349–55 (D. Del. 2003)). 
 104. MBIA Ins. Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 348, 350–51. 
 105. Complaint, Royal Indem. Co. v. Pepper Hamilton LLP, No. 05-165-JJF (D. Del. Mar. 18, 
2005) (relating to the Student Finance Corporation fraud). 
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C. Complexities of Modern Financial Markets 
The complexities of modern financial markets can aggravate the 
failures discussed above, in part because of the information uncertainty 
and the high sensitivity of markets to information. Financial markets rely 
critically on the supply of liquidity in the form of credit.
106
 The ability to 
contract for credit, in turn, depends on information not only about the 
economic health of the party seeking credit and its ability to repay 
(―counterparty risk‖) but also about how the structure of the credit 
transaction more generally exposes the parties to risk.
107
 
One way in which markets per se create information uncertainty is the 
―indirect-holding system‖ under which virtually all debt and equity 
securities are presently traded, with intermediary entities holding securities 
on behalf of investors. Issuers of the securities generally record ownership 
as belonging to one or more depository intermediaries, which, in turn, 
record the identities of other intermediaries (such as brokerage firms or 
banks) that buy interests in the securities. Those other intermediaries, then, 
record the identities of investors that buy interests in the intermediaries‘ 
interests.
108
 This seemingly convoluted system has decisive advantages 
over a direct-holding system for securities: it reduces the costs of record 
keeping and lowers the risk of loss occasioned by physically transferring 
securities.
109
 Inadvertently, however, the indirect-holding system 
exacerbates uncertainty by reducing transparency: third parties cannot 
readily determine who ultimately owns, and thus has credit exposure to, 
specific securities because there is no single location from which third 
parties can easily get that information.
110
 
Furthermore, investors and other market participants often apply highly 
sophisticated mathematical techniques to attempt to quantify market 
information. Although this often can increase investment precision, it 
sometimes can backfire. Professors Khandani and Lo have hypothesized, 
for example, that the subprime crisis resulted, at least in part, from a 
convergence in hedge-fund quantitatively constructed investment 
strategies. They argue that when a number of hedge funds experienced 
unprecedented losses during the week of August 6, 2007, the hedge funds 
 
 
 106. MEIR KOHN, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS 727 (1994); JOSEPH STIGLITZ & 
BRUCE GREENWALD, TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM IN MONETARY ECONOMICS 142 (2003).  
 107. STIGLITZ & GREENWALD, supra note 106, at 142–43.  
 108. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk in a Global Economy, 50 DUKE L.J. 1541, 1547–
48 (2001).  
 109. Id. at 1549. 
 110. Id. at 1583.  
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rapidly unwound sizable portfolios—likely based on a multi-strategy fund 
or proprietary-trading desk.
111
 This unanticipated correlation of initial 
losses
112
 then caused further losses by triggering stop/loss and de-
leveraging policies.
113
  
Regardless of the extent that the subprime crisis might have resulted 
from a convergence in quantitatively constructed investment strategies, the 
very existence of these strategies points out a broader potential to 
aggravate failure. Investments in financial markets are so tied to 
mathematical strategies that particular events can formulaically trigger 
massive sell-offs without parties having the time or opportunity to exercise 
judgment. This tight coupling of financial markets is itself a serious risk 
factor.
114
  
Information uncertainty, whatever its source, is especially dangerous 
when combined with nonlinear feedback effects and tight coupling
115—a 
combination which inadvertently can be created or exacerbated by 
regulation.
116
 This is perhaps best exemplified by mark-to-market, or ―fair 
value,‖ accounting. In its simplest form, this is the common regulatory 
requirement
117
 that a securities account be adjusted in response to a change 
in the market value of the securities. An investor, for example, may buy 
securities on credit from a securities broker-dealer, securing the purchase 
price by pledging the securities as collateral. To guard against the price of 
the securities falling to the point where their value as collateral is 
insufficient to repay the purchase price, the broker-dealer requires the 
investor to maintain a minimum collateral value. If the market value of the 
securities falls below this minimum, the broker-dealer will issue a ―margin 
call‖ requiring the investor to deposit additional collateral, usually in the 
form of money or additional securities, to satisfy this minimum. Failure to 
 
 
 111. Amir Khandani & Andrew W. Lo, What Happened to the Quants in August 2007? (Sept. 20, 
2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1015987&download=yes. 
 112. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
 113. Khandani & Lo, supra note 111, at 1. 
 114. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 115. Nonlinearity results when ―interactions among components of a system are not directly 
proportional.‖ Virginia R. Burkett et al., Nonlinear Dynamics in Ecosystem Response to Climactic 
Change: Case Studies and Policy Implications, 2 J. ECOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY 357, 359 (2005). 
 116. BOOKSTABER, supra note 68, at 146 (―[T]he natural reaction to [financial] market breakdown 
is to add layers of protection and regulation. But trying to regulate a market entangled by complexity 
can lead to unintended consequences, compounding crises rather than extinguishing them because the 
safeguards add even more complexity, which in turn feeds more failure.‖). 
 117. Accounting rules are a form of regulation, being promulgated (in the United States) by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board pursuant to its delegation of authority from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Facts About FASB (2008), at 1, 
http://www.fasb.org/facts/facts_about_fasb.pdf (discussing this delegation of regulatory authority).  
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do so triggers a default, enabling the broker-dealer to foreclose on the 
collateral.
118
  
Requiring investors to ―mark to market‖ in this fashion is generally 
believed to reduce risk.
119
 Nonetheless, it can cause ―perverse effects on 
systemic stability‖ during times of market turbulence, when forcing sales 
of assets to meet margin calls can depress asset prices, requiring more 
forced sales (which, in turn, will depress asset prices even more), causing 
a downward spiral.
120
 The existence of leverage makes this spiral more 
likely and amplifies it if it occurs.
121
 At least some portion of the subprime 
crisis appears to have been caused by this downward spiral.
122
 
Another way that the complexities of modern financial markets can 
aggravate failures is through human interactive behavior. When financial 
markets exhibit properties of a complex system, the ability to predict 
consequences, such as cause-and-effect explanations for market 
movements, is frustrated by nonlinear feedback effects arising from 
interactivities among market participants.
123
 For example, just a few years 
ago, home prices were described as overinflated in many markets due 
partially to lax lending standards that artificially fuelled demand for higher 
priced homes.
124
 At the same time, credit became increasingly available to 
 
 
 118. ZVI BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 71–72 (8th ed. 2008). 
 119. See, e.g., Gikas A. Hardouvelis & Panayiotis Theodossiou, The Asymmetric Relationship 
Between Initial Margin Requirements and Stock Market Volatility Across Bull and Bear Markets, 15 
REV. FIN. STUD. 1525, 1554–55 (2002) (finding a correlation between higher margin calls and 
decreased systemic risk, and speculating that higher margin calls may bleed the irrationality out of the 
market until only sound bets are left). 
 120. Rodrigo Cifuentes, Gianluigi Ferrucci & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity Risk and Contagion 2 
(Bank of Eng. Working Paper No. 264, 2005), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
publications/workingpapers/wp264.pdf); see also Clifford De Souza & Mikhail Smirnov, Dynamic 
Leverage: A Contingent Claims Approach to Leverage for Capital Conservation, J. PORTFOLIO 
MGMT., Fall 2004, at 25, 28 (arguing that, in a bad market, short-term pressure to sell assets to raise 
cash for margin calls can lead to further mark-to-market losses for remaining assets, which triggers a 
whole new wave of selling, the process repeating itself until markets improve or the firm is wiped out; 
and referring to this process as a ―Critical Liquidation Cycle‖). 
 121. De Souza & Smirnov, supra note 120, at 26–27. 
 122. Rachel Evans, Banks Tell of Downward Spiral, 27 INT‘L FIN. L. REV. 16 (June 2008). 
 123. See NEIL F. JOHNSON, PAUL JEFFERIES & PAK MING HUI, FINANCIAL MARKET COMPLEXITY 
4 (2003) (also describing this as the difficulty of distinguishing exogenous from endogenous factors); 
Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment Theory: Implications for 
Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L. REV. 137, 157 (1991) (observing that 
irrational investor behavior that interferes with market efficiency is sometimes referred to as ―noise‖). 
Cf. BOOKSTABER, supra note 68, at 156 (observing that when market participants have a self-interest 
in gaming the system, it is all the more likely that an unanticipated crisis will arise). 
 124. Ted Cornwell, Merrill Lynch Sees Credit Concerns Persisting in Mortgage Arena, NAT‘L 
MORTGAGE NEWS, May 30, 2005, at 15 (describing comments by Merrill Lynch analyst Kenneth 
Bruce that mortgage borrowers were ―overleveraged‖ and that ―creative financing‖ was driving 
overinflated home prices). 
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less creditworthy borrowers as investors sought higher rates—arguably 
expecting home prices to continue to rise unabated.
125
 The increasing 
availability of credit overinflated home prices even more, causing a 
greater- than-expected decline when the bubble burst.
126
 In turn, this 
greater-than-expected decline in home prices not only caused mortgage 
owners to suffer higher-than-expected losses but also increased the rate of 
foreclosure, which itself further depressed home prices (causing mortgage 
owners to suffer even more).
127
  
Another example of this nonlinear feedback effect is caused by the 
interactive nature of securities trading. Modern financial markets often 
feature quickly adapting participants trading in sophisticated securities. 
This can frustrate stability—resulting in positive feedback loops and a 
failure of arbitrage price correction—when participants trade as much in 
reaction to the expected behavior and strategy of others as on their own 
information and analysis.
128
 An extreme form of this phenomenon can 
occur when investors make their investment decisions by anticipating what 
other investors will do.
129
 
 
 
 125. Tom Petruno, Cheap Loans are Under Fire: Mortgage Companies Are on the Defensive for 
Loosening Credit Standards Amid the Housing Boom, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005, at C1, C4 
(explaining that mortgage lenders continued to loosen credit standards to insure fee income and higher 
rates amid Fed rate hikes and skyrocketing home prices); see also David Streitfeld, It‟s Not a Bubble 
Until it Bursts: Although Ignoring Real Estate Bears Has Been Profitable Lately, Doom is Again on 
Some Lips, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2005 (describing participants in real estate markets as making 
investment decisions based primarily on their predictions of the behavior of other participants—
namely mortgage lenders and home buyers). 
 126. The Fed‟s Alibi, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2007, at A16 (―The Fed‘s easy money policies helped 
cause the housing bubble and subprime crisis . . . .‖). 
 127. Justin Lahart, Summer‟s Woes May Be Felt for Some Time, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007, at 
C1 (observing that a dramatic tightening of standards by purchasers in the secondary mortgage market, 
after ―rising default rates . . . led to steep losses‖ to mortgage owners). 
 128. See Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87 AM. 
ECON. REV. 847, 847 (1997) (describing experimental results involving an ―information cascade‖ in 
which it is more ―rational‖ for an individual to follow the decisions of others than to act on private 
information and analysis; this information cascade continues until some later player recognizes what 
has happened and deviates); Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An Experimental-Asset-Market 
Approach to Financial Regulation, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 977, 984 (arguing that experimental asset 
markets are effective tools to evaluate the effectiveness of laws designed to limit market imperfections 
such as asset price bubbles in the context of complex adaptive markets); Schwarcz, Rethinking the 
Disclosure Paradigm, supra note 48, at 4–5 (explaining that fund managers might still trade with an 
irrational herd rather than seizing the arbitrage opportunity because managers face greater scrutiny for 
betting against a herd, have finite employment horizons, and have investment expertise that rapidly 
depreciates in evolving financial markets); supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting that volatility 
and illiquidity can result from interactive behavior within markets). 
 129. See, e.g., James Surowiecki, Everyone‟s Watching, NEW YORKER, Nov. 10, 2008, at 35 
(observing that, ―in an environment of profound uncertainty [as has happened in the subprime crisis], 
investors have a natural if troubling tendency to turn to [futures markets for, and foreign markets in, 
the same types of securities] as horoscopes,‖ thereby turning ―investing [into] an exercise in 
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Finally, the complexities of modern financial markets can aggravate 
failures through the interconnectedness of market participants. Financial 
institutions are often connected with one another through—and in that 
capacity, are characterized as ―counterparties‖ to—derivatives contracts.130 
These financial instruments, most notably credit-default swaps (CDS),
131
 
are used by institutions to hedge against the risk on their own 
investments.
132
 Institutions sometimes also use them to earn fees for 
insuring risk on another party‘s investments.133 Because of these 
interconnecting contracts, bankruptcy or other failures of a given market 
participant can cause that participant to default on its obligations to other 
market participants, who in turn—if the obligations in default are large 
enough—might default on their own obligations to market participants, 
leading to a domino-effect collapse.
134
 Counterparty risk—essentially an 
information failure caused by lack of transparency as to counterparty 
financial condition—is further complicated by the lack of a formal trading 
system for these types of derivatives, which are simply contracts between 
private parties.
135
 The inability of market participants to know how much 
contingent exposure another participant might have on these contracts 
increases the uncertainty.  
These risks came to a head with the Federal Reserve bailouts of Bear 
Stearns and AIG. Bear Stearns, for example, had a subsidiary hedge fund 
which was believed to hold a large mortgage-backed securities portfolio of 
uncertain value.
136
 At the same time, that subsidiary appeared to have 
 
 
anticipating what other investors will do‖; and also arguing that this tendency ―can easily lead to 
contagion [because] selling in one market triggers selling in the next‖). 
 130. PHELIM BOYLE & FEIDHLIM BOYLE, DERIVATIVES: THE TOOLS THAT CHANGED FINANCE 7 
(2001) (defining parties to a contract, especially a derivatives contract, as ―counterparties‖). 
 131. In a credit-default swap, one party (the credit ―seller‖) agrees, in exchange for the payment to 
it of a fee by a second party (the credit ―buyer‖), to assume the credit risk of certain debt obligations of 
a specified borrower or other obligor. If a ―credit event‖ (for example, default or bankruptcy) occurs in 
respect of that obligor, the credit seller will either (a) pay the credit buyer an amount calculated by 
reference to post-default value of the debt obligations or (b) buy the debt obligations (or other eligible 
debt obligations of the obligor) for their full face value from the credit buyer. SCHWARCZ, 
STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 47, § 10:3.1, at 10–16. 
 132. Frank Packer & Haibin Zhu, Contractual Terms and CDS Pricing, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2005, 
at 89. 
 133. Well over 90% of derivatives contracts are currently credit-default swaps. See, e.g., 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC‘S QUARTERLY REPORTS ON BANK DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES 
2009, http://www.occ.treas.gov/deriv/deriv.htm. 
 134. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 3, at 198–200. 
 135. CDS transactions are presently ―over the counter,‖ meaning they are entered into 
contractually and not on an exchange. 
 136. See, e.g., Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of Federal 
Financial Regulators, Panel I of the hearing of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
Committee, Federal News Service, Apr. 3, 2008 (Statement of Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) that 
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significant exposure to other market participants on CDS contracts.
137
 The 
fear was that the subsidiary‘s assets would be insufficient to pay its 
liabilities on the CDS contracts.
138
 Counterparty risk is also believed to be 
integral to the failure of credit markets in the subprime crisis.
139
 
The Article next examines how failures resulting from complexity 
should be addressed. 
III. ADDRESSING MARKET FAILURES RESULTING FROM COMPLEXITY 
Complexity can add great efficiency and depth to financial markets, but 
it also can cause a multitude of market failures. These failures, however, 
fall into three broad categories: (A) failures, such as impaired disclosure, 
caused by information uncertainty; (B) failures, such as financial 
contagion and the inability to predict consequences, caused by 
nonlinearity and tight coupling; and (C) failures, such as moral hazard, 
servicer paralysis, and fraud, caused by conflicts and other forms of 
―misalignment.‖ The causes of these failures are similar to those that 
engineers have long faced when working with complex systems that have 
nonlinear feedback effects.
140
 Moreover, many characteristics of complex 
 
 
one of the reasons for Bear Stearns‘ failure was that ―[t]wo of [Bear Stearns‘] hedge funds went under 
due to mortgages in the summer‖). 
 137. Cf. Testimony of Ben Bernanke, Federal Reserve Chairman, before the House Financial 
Services Committee, Transcript of the Semiannual Humphrey Hawkins Hearing on Monetary Policy of 
the House Financial Services Committee, Federal News Service, July 16, 2008 (―Part of the reason 
that it was a big concern to us when Bear Stearns came to the brink of failure was that we were 
concerned that there were various markets where the failure of a major counterparty would have 
created enormous strains to the financial system.‖). 
 138. David Henry, Wall Street‟s Perfect Storm: Investors Deal with a Lehman Bankruptcy, the 
Sale of Merrill Lynch to BofA, and a Possible AIG Restructuring, BUS. WK., Sept. 15, 2008, 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/sep2008/db20080914_860761.htm (―[Treasury 
Secretary Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke] feared permitting Bear Stearns‘ 
bankruptcy would throw Wall Street into chaos because Bear had untold credit derivatives contracts in 
place with countless other banks and hedge funds.‖). Netting and, to a growing extent, collateral 
agreements are used to mitigate counterparty credit risks. COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS. 
AND THE EURO-CURRENCY STANDING COMM. OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP OF TEN 
COUNTRIES, BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, REPORT ON OTC DERIVATIVES: SETTLEMENT 
PROCEDURES AND COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT 1 (1998), http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
ecsc08.htm. In the United States, recent bankruptcy law changes are intended to further mitigate this 
risk by preventing an institution from ―cherry-picking‖ favorable contracts with its derivatives 
counterparties. Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy 
Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 641, 642 (2005). These bankruptcy law changes, which apply to derivatives contracts, modify 
U.S. bankruptcy law under which entities in bankruptcy generally have the right to choose to continue 
with profitable contracts while terminating unprofitable contracts with the same counterparty. Id. at 
642, 647, 660, 663. 
 139. Schwarcz, Keynote Address, supra note 3. 
 140. I make this observation not only based on my experience and expertise as a finance lawyer 
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engineering systems are similar to those of financial markets.
141
 For these 
reasons, this Article will also take into account the ―chaos theory‖ that 
helps to inform engineers about complex systems with nonlinear feedback 
effects.
142
 
Of course, important differences exist between engineered systems and 
financial markets. Engineers and scientists often can perform real 
experiments, yielding results that may well be more precise than the 
results of empirical studies of financial markets. In part, this is because 
interactive market behavior—in which ―banks, consumers, firms, . . . 
 
 
and professor but also as a former engineer. Cf. John Kambhu et al., Systemic Risk in Ecology and 
Engineering, 13 FRBNY ECON. POL‘Y REV. 25, 25 (2007) (―Several fields of engineering and science 
share with economics a keen concern with systemic risk.‖); Joseph H. Sommer, Commentary: Where 
is the Economic Analysis of Payment Law?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751 (2008) (arguing that 
engineering principles apply to analyzing the law of payment systems). 
 141. Hsieh, Chaos and Nonlinear Dynamics, supra note 19. Financial markets originally were 
modeled as linear systems. The efficient capital market hypothesis (EMH), for example, posits that 
―the market prices securities as if there was a rational process, whether or not the market‘s constituent 
actors qualify as rational.‖ Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: 
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 852 (1992). Another model, the random walk 
theory, is effectively a subset of the EMH because it ―maintains that the market is efficient, with prices 
moving so rapidly in response to new information that investors cannot consistently buy or sell fast 
enough to benefit.‖ Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment 
Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L. REV. 137, 
157 (1991). It is questionable, however, whether the EMH validly describes markets for complex 
securities, since many legitimate transactions in which securities are issued are ―so complex that less 
than a critical mass of investors can understand them in a reasonable time period [and to that extent] 
the market will not reach a fully informed price equilibrium, and hence will not be efficient.‖ 
Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm, supra note 48, at 19. Moreover, the EMH does not 
appear to validly describe markets for debt securities. Even publicly-traded debt markets are not 
efficient. See, e.g., Yedidia Z. Stern, A General Model for Corporate Acquisition Law, 26 J. CORP. L. 
675, 709 (2001) (―[S]tudies show that the bond market is not efficient; and therefore, one cannot 
expect the market prices to compensate bondholders for the risks to which they are exposed.‖). 
Privately traded debt markets may be even less efficient. Camden Asset Mgmt., L.P. v. Sunbeam 
Corp., No. 99-8275-CIV, at *31–36 (S.D. Fla. July 3, 2001) (stating that privately placed Rule 144A-
exempt securities, being thinly traded, do not have an efficient market). It therefore is highly unlikely 
that the EMH validly describes markets for complex debt securities—the category that includes 
virtually all investment securities issued in securitization and other structured financing transactions, 
SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 47, § 1:1, at 1–5, and all of the securities involved in 
the subprime crisis, Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 376.  
 142. Cf. Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear 
Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546, 593 (1994) 
(arguing that markets are nonlinear systems because ―deeper structural phenomena‖ than information 
about asset values affect market movements); Patrick J. Glen, The Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis, Chaos Theory, and the Insider Filing Requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934: The Predictive Power of Form 4 Filings, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 85 (2005) (discussing, 
in the context of the insider filings requirements of the securities laws, the extent to which chaos 
theory might inform financial market models). The disconnect between market prices and fundamental 
underlying asset values in the subprime crisis provided recent concrete evidence that financial markets 
have characteristics of nonlinear systems. See infra note 197. Cf. Glen, supra at 99 (observing that 
such a disconnect would signal nonlinearity).  
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investors [and other economic agents] continually adjust their market 
moves, buying decisions, prices, and forecasts to the situation these moves 
or decisions or prices or forecasts together create‖—adds a ―layer of 
complication . . . not experienced in the natural sciences‖ where reactions 
are simpler and more predictable.
143
 Engineers also often enjoy the luxury 
of being able to stop and restart a system.
144
 Nonetheless, with appropriate 
discretion, certain engineering insights translate robustly to financial-
market analysis. 
Recognizing that ―apparently there are no general laws for complexity 
[and so] one must reach for ‗lessons‘ that might, with insight and 
understanding, be learned in one system and applied to another,‖145 the 
analysis below explores potential ways that market participants and 
regulators can attempt to retain the financial-market efficiency, 
sophistication, and depth afforded by complexity while reducing the 
potential for its market failures.
146
 Because these failures can cut across 
the specific factual patterns identified in Part II, the analysis is organized 
functionally by the nature of each failure, first addressing failures arising 
from uncertainty, then failures arising from nonlinear feedback and tight 
coupling, and finally failures resulting from conflicts and other forms of 
―misalignment‖ that result from complexity.147  
A. Addressing Information Failures Arising from Uncertainty  
Uncertainty can cause a variety of financial-market failures, most 
obviously impairing securities disclosure.
148
 This impairment reflects the 
 
 
 143. Arthur, supra note 18, at 107. 
 144. J. M. Ottino, Engineering Complex Systems, 427 NATURE 399, 399 (2004). 
 145. Nigel Goldenfeld & Leo P. Kadanoff, Simple Lessons from Complexity, SCIENCE, Apr. 2, 
1999, at 87, 89 (predicting an increasing study of complexity ―with a view to better understanding‖ 
economic as well as physical and biological systems).  
 146. One reviewer of this Article questions, as devil‘s advocate, whether the subprime crisis has 
upset the very conception that, absent market failures, unrestrained financial markets are efficient. 
Because I have argued that several types of market failures—including complexity—in fact 
contributed to the subprime crisis, see supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text, I see no justification 
for that extreme position. 
 147. This Article does not purport to cover all types of conflicts that could cause market failure, 
just those that result from complexity. For a more complete discussion of conflicts that could cause 
market failure, see generally Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, and Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 
26 YALE J. ON REG. 457 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1322536 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Conflicts and the Financial Collapse]. 
 148. See supra notes 48–57 and accompanying text (discussing, among other things, that 
complexity increases the cost of analyzing and valuing securities, and that at some point the cost 
increase can exceed the benefit gained). 
  
 
 
 
 
2009] REGULATING COMPLEXITY 239 
 
 
 
 
engineering principle that where a system or structure is complex, the 
abstractions and simplifications needed to make its problems approachable 
can introduce significant uncertainty.
149
 Assumptions made in civil 
engineering, for example, introduce uncertainties when assessing the 
strength of buildings and their potential to collapse.
150
 There are several 
potential ways to deal with this impaired disclosure: tolerate it, proscribe 
transactions with impaired disclosure or otherwise impose regulation 
attempting to reduce uncertainty, or implement supplemental protections 
to minimize the impairment.
151
  
Toleration would not work because impaired disclosure makes 
securities markets inefficient.
152
 Proscribing transactions with impaired 
disclosure would not work because it inadvertently would ban many 
beneficial transactions.
153
 Complexity is not an end in itself but usually is a 
by-product of salutary goals such as seeking to transfer risk to parties 
better positioned to hold the risk and reducing the cost of funding 
businesses.
154
 The harm averted by proscription would, therefore, likely 
exceed its benefits.
155
  
 
 
 149. MORGAN & HENRION, supra note 58, at 47. Uncertainty also might indicate randomness, or 
an inability to quantify probability. Id. at 63 (discussing the Heisenberg uncertainty principle in 
quantum mechanics, which holds that it is possible to know either the location or the momentum of a 
particle, but observing one property makes it impossible to observe the other). Sometimes systems 
might appear random, however, because of an incomplete understanding of the underlying processes. 
Id. 
 150. See BILAL M. AYYUB, RISK ANALYSIS IN ENGINEERING AND ECONOMICS 28 (2003) 
(discussing fuzzy set theory as a method for addressing ―[a]pproximations [that] arise from human 
cognition and intelligence . . . and result in uncertainty . . . .‖). 
 151. In engineering too, designers of systems must choose to tolerate, eliminate, or provide 
supplement protections against undesirable byproducts. Cf. Dinmukhamed Eshanov, The Role of 
Multinational Corporations from the Neoinstitutionalist and International Law Perspectives: The 
Concept of the Three-Level Game, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 110, 122 (2008) (observing that despite 
growing evidence that chlorofluorohydrocarbons were creating a hole in the ozone layer, CFCs were 
not banned until a viable substitute was created); Nicholas A. Robinson, Legal Systems, 
Decisionmaking, and the Science of Earth‟s Systems: Procedural Missing Links, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
1077, 1108 (2001) (observing that the harmful exhaust produced as a byproduct by automotive internal 
combustion engines was tolerated because automobiles have become a transportation necessity but 
catalytic converters, which eliminate almost 90% of unwanted pollutants, were introduced as a 
supplemental protection). 
 152. Schwarcz, Disclosure‟s Failure, supra note 52, at 1116–17. 
 153. Id. at 1117–18. 
 154. See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text. Even in Enron, complexity was not an end in 
itself but a (perhaps misguided) attempt to minimize financial-statement losses and volatility, 
accelerate profits, and avoid adding debt to its balance sheet which could have hurt Enron‘s credit 
rating and thereby damage its credibility in the energy trading business. Schwarcz, Enron, supra note 
10, at 1309–10. 
 155. Schwarcz, Disclosure‟s Failure, supra note 52, at 1118. Efficiency demands that the costs of 
regulation do not exceed its benefits. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 
13–14 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing this ―Kaldor-Hicks‖ standard as the operating standard of efficiency); 
  
 
 
 
 
240 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:211 
 
 
 
 
Other regulatory attempts to reduce uncertainty are also unlikely to 
work. Any such regulation would run into the conundrum that uncertainty 
can be irreducible, in that the abstractions and simplifications needed to 
make a complex system approachable can themselves introduce significant 
uncertainty.
156
 For example, Professor Henry Hu has argued that regulators 
cannot keep up with development of complex derivatives products because 
academic publishing, in which such developments may first appear, ―is not 
a timely regulatory tool,‖ and also because most information about new 
financial products is not made public for competitive reasons.
157
 To reduce 
this uncertainty, he considered the possibility of regulation that would 
institutionalize a ―system of information gathering to cope with‖ ongoing 
financial innovation.
158
 But such a system, he cautioned, could be costly, 
causing the possible ―loss of valuable proprietary information‖ and 
tempting financial institutions ―to follow regulator-approved models on 
pain of increased regulatory scrutiny.‖159 Even worse, he concluded, 
regulators may not be sophisticated enough to interpret, and indeed may 
misinterpret, this information.
160
  
Similarly, regulatory attempts to limit uncertainty by standardizing 
transactions and financial products would likely have unintended negative 
consequences.
161
 Professor Gale has argued that investor unfamiliarity 
with new securities creates ―an additional source of uncertainty which is 
not traceable to the randomness of the underlying asset returns.‖162 
Consistent with Gale, this Article has described how the complexities of 
securities involved in the subprime crisis created significant uncertainty.
163
 
 
 
accord, Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1015 
(2001). Cost-benefit balancing is also a well-recognized test for regulatory political viability. For 
example, before any major rule may take effect in the United States, regulatory agencies must submit a 
cost-benefit analysis to Congress. Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 801–08 (2006). Although I believe that proscribing transactions with impaired disclosure would 
inadvertently ban many beneficial transactions, actual empirical cost-benefit balancing is often 
impossible for anything but a trivial problem. Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource 
Allocation, and Liability Rules—A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 70 (1968). Ultimately, regulators 
must make best guesses regarding the efficacy of proposed actions. Id. 
 156. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 157. See Hu, supra note 3, at 1499. 
 158. Id. at 1503, 1505–06. 
 159. Id. at 1508. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Cf. supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text (discussing unintended negative 
consequences of accounting regulation). 
 162. Douglas Gale, Standard Securities, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 731, 734 (1992). 
 163. See supra Part II.B. In this context, it is somewhat ironic that securitization itself is a means 
of standardizing the underlying assets, securitized assets being ―more likely to be considered as a part 
of a standardized class of assets than any one specific mortgage would be.‖ Hellwig, supra note 3, at 
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Regulation, though, is probably not the best way to address this 
uncertainty. Because market conditions change in real time and, thus, are 
more fluid than regulatory change, imposing standardization through law 
would block design innovations needed to adapt securities to changing 
markets. Standardization appears to be better achieved by market 
participants themselves—as would occur when investors charge 
uncertainty premiums.
164
 
Implementing cost-effective supplemental protections, therefore, 
appears to be the best approach to the problem of impaired disclosure. 
These protections could include guaranties by sellers (such as warranties) 
and governmental and private-sector certifications of quality.
165
  
In a limited sense, a form of seller ―guaranty‖ is being considered for 
financial markets by having underwriters of securities disclose that they 
hold (and intend to continue to hold) exposure to pari passu or subordinate 
positions in the securities being sold. In this way, the underwriter puts 
―skin in the game‖ to signal its belief in the safety of the securities.166  
This approach, however, can sometimes backfire.
167
 In the subprime 
crisis, for example, underwriters customarily purchased some portion of 
the subordinated ―equity‖ tranches of ABS CDO securities to demonstrate 
their belief in the securities being sold.
168
 Unfortunately, at least some of 
these underwriters did not fully understand the risks associated with their 
 
 
13. Professor Hellwig has ―serious doubts,‖ however, about the second and higher tiers of 
securitization represented by CDO and ABS CDO securities. Even though these additional layers ―will 
provide for additional risk diversification,‖ their ―benefits seem ephemeral [because investors could 
diversify with multiple MBS investments] and the potential incentive effects large [e.g., increasing the 
scope for moral hazard by further diluting incentives for institutions handling the MBS stage to 
actively control the quality of the mortgages they were packaging].‖ Id. at 23–24. 
 164. Cf. Gale, supra note 162, at 731 (arguing that investors will charge an ―uncertainty premium‖ 
on unfamiliar securities). I do not know whether investors charged sufficient uncertainty premiums in 
the subprime crisis. Any failure to do so may well be due to the other market failures described in this 
Article, such as conflicts of interest. See infra notes 287–94 and accompanying text. 
 165. Schwarcz, Disclosure‟s Failure, supra note 52, at 1118–21. 
 166. Fitch Ratings Special Report, Exposure Draft: Retaining Equity Piece Risk—Enhancing 
Transparency 2 (June 24, 2008) (seeking market feedback as to whether to invite key transaction 
parties to disclose whether they retain economic risk in the securities being sold); see also EUROPEAN 
SECURITIES MARKET EXPERT GROUP, ROLE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (June 2008) 
(recommending that rating agencies disclose information regarding an originator‘s or sponsor‘s 
retained interest in securities). These approaches are not, of course, true guaranties because investors 
would have no claim for losses. For a suggestion, albeit unrealistic, that true guaranties be used, see 
Daniel Andrews, The Clean Up: Investors Need Better Advice on Structured Finance Products, 26 
INT‘L FIN. L. REV. 14, 14 (2007). 
 167. Fitch, supra note 166, at 1 (there are ―currently no data available to assess whether such 
retention or non-retention of equity piece risk actually has a greater impact on a transaction‘s 
performance‖).  
 168. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 381. Cf. Hellwig, supra note 3, at 
16 (―As time went on, ever greater portions of equity tranches were sold to outside investors.‖). 
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retained tranches. This resulted in what can be called a ―mutual 
misinformation‖ problem: by signaling its (unjustified) confidence in the 
securities being sold, the seller inadvertently misleads investors into 
buying those securities.
169
 Mutual-misinformation problems are intractable 
almost by definition. Nonetheless, to the extent these problems are caused 
by the inherent uncertainty of securities being priced off quantitative 
models in the absence of an actual or active market,
170
 the depth of the 
resulting losses in the subprime crisis suggests that investors—at least in 
the short term—are likely to avoid such reliance, obviating the need for a 
regulatory response.
171
 Still, because investors over time tend to choose 
higher rates of return over investment discipline,
172
 there may come a time 
when regulation, or its threat, is needed to restore that discipline. 
Private-sector certifications of quality can also improve impaired 
securities disclosure, especially where the certification achieves an 
economy of scale. This approach is currently employed, for example, 
through rating-agency ratings on debt securities.
173
 In the subprime crisis, 
however, rating agencies were said to contribute to the crisis,
174
 and there 
are various proposals under consideration to improve the quality of the 
rating system.
175
 Although it is too early to know the extent to which these 
proposals will improve the rating system, it is doubtful that any type of 
government certification would be more successful. In the United States, 
at least, private-sector analysts tend to be more capable and more 
accountable than government analysts due at least in part to the former‘s 
higher compensation incentives.
176
 
These are all only second-best or partial solutions to the problem of 
uncertainty. There do not, however, appear to be any perfect solutions. 
Government already takes a somewhat paternalistic stance by mandating 
 
 
 169. This approach also could be misleading to the extent, for example, the retained securities 
bear higher interest rates than those being sold, compensating for the risk. Failure to disclose that 
higher rate, however, is likely to constitute securities law fraud, at least in the United States.  
 170. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
 171. Cf. infra notes 284–85 and accompanying text (observing that investors tend, over time, to 
forsake investment discipline for higher rates of return). 
 172. See infra note 285. 
 173. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (observing, among other things, that debt securities 
are rated by their likelihood of timely payment). 
 174. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 400–04. 
 175. Cf. Richard Barley, Ability to Track Risk Has Shrunk „Forever‟-Moody‟s, REUTERS, Jan. 6, 
2008, http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USL0455354526680107 (explaining a statement 
by Moody‘s Investor Services that in the face of extreme complexity arising from financial innovation, 
the ability to track risk had been severely undermined, and that market participants should be required 
to hold additional capital). 
 176. Schwarcz, Disclosure‟s Failure, supra note 52, at 1120. 
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minimum investor sophistication for investing in complex securities; yet 
sophisticated investors and qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) are the 
very investors who lost the most money in the subprime financial crisis.
177
 
And any attempt by government to restrict firms from engaging in 
complex transactions would be risky because of the potential of 
inadvertently banning beneficial transactions.
178
  
The discussion above addresses when uncertainty causes failure 
through impaired securities disclosure. Uncertainty also can cause failure 
when information about market participants is not made public. This is 
illustrated by counterparty risk among market participants on CDS and 
other derivatives contracts.
179
 This risk is problematic because market 
participants are unable to discern how much contingent exposure their 
counterparties have to other market participants.
180
  
Counterparties can mitigate this risk voluntarily by disclosing their 
contingent liabilities on credit derivatives. Regulation also can enhance the 
disclosure, such as by requiring counterparties to credit-derivative 
transactions, or intermediaries for those parties, to keep a registry of the 
transactions from which market participants can ascertain risk 
allocation.
181
 The extent to which enhanced disclosure will prove useful is 
uncertain, though. Under generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP), counterparties are already required to disclose many of their 
contingent liabilities.
182
 However, subtle judgment calls must be made as 
 
 
 177. See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Wall St. Banks Confront a String of Write-Downs, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 19, 2008, at C1 (―[M]ajor banks . . . have already written off more than $120 billion of losses 
stemming from bad mortgage-related investments.‖); Randall Smith, Merrill‟s $5 Billion Bath Bares 
Deeper Divide—After Big Write-Down Tied to Mortgage Debt, O‟Neal Asserts Control, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 6, 2007, at A1 (reporting a total of $20 billion in write-downs by large investment banks). 
 178. See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text; see also Gerard Caprio, Jr., Ash Demirguc-
Kunt & Edward J. Kane, The 2007 Meltdown in Structured Securitization: Searching for Lessons Not 
Scapegoats 5 (Nov. 23, 2008), available at www.ssrn/abstract=1424352 (―[A] tightly regulated 
financial system hampers growth.‖).  
 179. See supra notes 130–38 and accompanying text. 
 180. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text. 
 181. See, e.g., Christopher Cox, Op-Ed, Swapping Secrecy for Transparency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
19, 2008, at A12 (―Congress could require that dealers in over-the-counter credit-default swaps 
publicly report both their trades and the value of those trades.‖). 
 182. Contingent liabilities must be disclosed, at least in the footnotes to a firm‘s financial 
statements, if the contingency is merely a ―reasonable possibility.‖ FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
BD., ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 5: 
6 (1975) (allowing only remote risks to remain undisclosed). Sarbanes–Oxley also attempts to 
maximize GAAP disclosure of contingent liabilities by amending Section 13 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (2006), to add a new subsection (j), requiring the SEC to 
issue  
final rules providing that each annual and quarterly financial report required to be filed with 
the Commission shall disclose all material off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, 
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to how likely a contingency is to occur. If a counterparty assesses the 
likelihood as higher than it actually is, market participants may 
unnecessarily avoid doing business with the counterparty. But if the 
counterparty assesses the likelihood as lower than it actually is, market 
participants may be underpricing the risk of doing business with the 
counterparty.
183
  
Another hurdle to imposing enhanced disclosure through regulation is 
that derivatives are chameleon-like—they easily can change form and 
appearance—and there are myriad ways that risk can be transferred in 
transactions not regarded as derivatives, such as a simple guarantee for 
payment of a fee. Even a simple loan agreement can be characterized as a 
credit derivative.
184
 Any regulation of credit derivatives, therefore, will 
have to grapple with the problem of defining what is being regulated, with 
a narrow focus potentially omitting risk transfers that should be covered 
and a broad focus potentially being overly restrictive by including 
traditional commercial transactions. 
If disclosure-related approaches are inadequate to address the 
uncertainty and information failures caused by credit derivatives, the next 
step might be to consider banning or otherwise limiting credit derivatives. 
This Article does not address that next step.
185
 Risk transfer is not 
inherently bad; indeed it can maximize efficiency if risk is transferred—as 
is the goal of credit derivatives—to parties better able to bear the risk.186 
Nonetheless, future research should explore whether, as might have 
 
 
obligations (including contingent obligations), and other relationships of the issuer with 
unconsolidated entities or other persons, that may have a material current or future effect on 
financial condition, changes in financial condition, results of operations, liquidity, capital 
expenditures, capital resources, or significant components of revenues or expenses. 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 401(j), 116 Stat. 786 (2002). 
 183. Another possible approach to mitigate counterparty risk might be for CDS contracts, which 
have many characteristics of insurance, SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 47, § 10:4.1, 
to be regulated like insurance policies. This approach is beyond this Article‘s scope. 
 184. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 101(53B) (broadly defining a ―swap agreement‖). I personally have seen loan 
transactions structured as swaps, and Professor Hu reports of a case where a bank mistakenly thought a 
loan was a swap. Hu, supra note 3, at 1480; see also In re Nat‘l Gas Distributors, LLC, 556 F.3d 247 
(4th Cir. 2009) (observing that 11 U.S.C. § 101(53B)‘s broad definition ―barely distinguish[es] any 
major commercial contract from a swap agreement‖). Cf. ANDREW M. CHISHOLM, DERIVATIVES 
DEMYSTIFIED: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO FORWARDS, FUTURES, SWAPS AND OPTIONS 1 (2004) 
(defining a ―derivative‖ as an asset whose value is derived from the value of some other asset known 
as the underlying); 12 C.F.R. § 563.172 (2009) (defining a ―financial derivative‖ as a ―financial 
contract whose value depends on the value of one or more underlying assets, indices, or reference 
rates‖). 
 185. But cf. supra notes 154–64 and accompanying text (arguing that proscribing transactions with 
impaired disclosure would inadvertently ban many beneficial transactions). 
 186. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT‘S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, 
LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (1999). 
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occurred in the subprime crisis, credit derivatives have dispersed risk so 
broadly as to create a type of collective-action problem: the ultimate risk-
bearing parties do not always have sufficient amounts at risk regarding any 
given underlying credit risk to motivate them to engage in due 
diligence.
187
 
Lastly, it should be recalled that the indirect-holding system for 
securities increases uncertainty about market participants.
188
 The proper 
response in this context is complicated by the fact that the indirect-holding 
system evolved to reduce the costs of record keeping and to lower the risk 
of loss occasioned by physically transferring securities.
189
 Any approach to 
deviate from that system in order to reduce uncertainty would thus have to 
take into account the possibility of increasing record keeping costs and 
losses—an analysis beyond the scope of this Article. In another context, 
however, this Article proposes that a firm should be able, at least during 
crises of investor confidence and turbulent markets, to avoid having to 
mark its securities portfolio to market by fully disclosing its underlying 
asset portfolio.
190
 This same approach could be used to reduce uncertainty 
without needing to modify the indirect-holding system.  
B. Addressing Failures Arising from Nonlinear Feedback and Tight 
Coupling 
Recall that when financial markets exhibit properties of a complex 
system, the ability to predict consequences, such as cause-and-effect 
explanations for market movements, is frustrated by nonlinear feedback 
effects arising from interactivities.
191
 Nonlinear feedback is especially 
dangerous when combined with tight coupling.
192
  
Currently, the most significant such combination is marking-to-
market.
193
 Although marking-to-market generally stabilizes financial 
markets by creating trust that assets are fairly valued, it destabilizes 
 
 
 187. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 390–91. Any regulation limiting 
credit derivatives would similarly have to grapple with the problem of defining what is being 
regulated; see supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (observing that third parties cannot readily 
determine who owns, and thus has credit exposure to, specific securities because there is no single 
location from which they can easily get that information). 
 189. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 190. See infra notes 200–04 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra notes 122–28 and accompanying text. It is less useful to try to determine which is 
the cause and which is the effect than to try to understand the interactive patterns and potential 
feedback effects. 
 192. See supra text accompanying note 115. 
 193. See supra notes 115–22 and accompanying text. 
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markets when investors lose confidence during times of market 
turbulence; then, requiring firms to sell assets to meet margin calls can 
artificially depress asset prices, causing a downward spiral.
194
 
This type of interactive complexity has led some to argue that 
quantitative tools should be augmented to perceive and account for the 
―observable and systematic‖ behavioral patterns that emerge as usually 
diverse market segments begin moving in lockstep, or where investors 
exhibit herding behavior.
195
 In the case of marking-to-market, one way to 
account for the interactive pattern is to recognize, as the subprime crisis 
has revealed, that liquidity and default are not always correlated.
196
 In that 
crisis, holders of securities that were unaffected by defaults found it 
difficult to sell or refinance those securities.
197
 This difficulty, in turn, 
created an even greater crisis of confidence, causing the market to 
collapse.
198
 At least part of the problem was caused by the requirement 
that firms sell the securities as market prices drop, causing prices to drop 
further.
199
  
This downward spiral could have been mitigated, if not prevented, by 
recognizing that when investors lose confidence and markets become 
turbulent,
200
 marking-to-market can be misleading and potentially 
dangerous.
201
 Although the feedback effect of marking-to-market dampens 
price perturbations in normal times, thereby stabilizing the financial 
system, the feedback effect of marking-to-market amplifies perturbations 
when investors lose confidence, thereby destabilizing the financial 
system.
202
 Regulators then should allow firms to substitute other measures 
of investor comfort for marking-to-market. One possible approach, for 
example,
203
 is to allow a firm otherwise required to mark-to-market to 
 
 
 194. See id. 
 195. Alan Greenspan, We Will Never Have a Perfect Model of Risk, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008, at 
9. 
 196. See, e.g., Dr. Alexander Dibelius, Chairman, Goldman Sachs Deutschland, Address at the 
Int‘l Berlin Business and Trade Law Conference, Humboldt University (June 12, 2008) (notes on file 
with author) (observing that liquidity and default are not necessarily correlated). 
 197. See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. v. Mont. Bd. of Invs., [2008] EWHC (Ch) 1594 (Eng.) (observing, at 
paragraph twenty-one of the opinion, that extreme illiquidity in the structured products markets 
reduced the market value of the (largely non-defaulted) collateral to significantly less than the present 
value of the collateral‘s expected cash flows).  
 198. Dibelius, supra note 196. 
 199. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.  
 200. Cf. Paul Krugman, A Catastrophe Foretold, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2007, at A25 (asserting 
that the downgrade of AAA bonds created a ―crisis of confidence‖ in financial markets). 
 201. CRMPG III REPORT, supra note 54, at 132–33.  
 202. Cf. id.; Posting of Yves Smith & Richard Kline to Naked Capitalism Blog, http://www. 
nakedcapitalism.com (May 12, 2008, 07:00 EST). 
 203. Another possible approach, suggested by Professor Ron Blasi, is to base mark-to-market 
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have the option, instead, to disseminate full disclosure of its underlying 
asset portfolio.
204
 For example, a firm that owns CDO securities could 
choose to disclose details about the mortgage loans and other financial 
assets underlying those securities in lieu of marking the securities to 
market,
205
 thereby enabling investors and other market participants to 
make more transparent valuations. This approach also would help reduce 
the anomaly,
206
 seen during the subprime crisis, of securities bearing 
market values substantially below their intrinsic values—the latter 
representing the present value of the reasonably expected cash flows of 
those securities.
207
 
As financial markets evolve, other nonlinear feedback effects will 
undoubtedly become tightly coupled in ways one cannot predict ex ante. It 
is also impossible to know precisely how future financial crises will arise. 
Consideration, therefore, should be given to more broad spectrum 
regulatory solutions.
208
  
One such possible approach is to establish a governmental entity to act, 
if needed, as a market liquidity provider of last resort (hereinafter, ―market 
liquidity provider‖) in order to more loosely couple the feedback effects.209 
 
 
accounting on a trailing average rather than a one-day snapshot of market values. Memorandum from 
Ronald W. Blasi, Professor of Law, Georgia State University, to the author (Nov. 17, 2008) (on file 
with author). This approach would at least dampen the amplifying perturbations. 
 204. This ―full disclosure‖ option has been proposed by Dr. Alexander Dibelius, supra note 196, 
and also by Donald S. Bernstein, Partner & Head, Insolvency & Restructuring Practice Group, Davis 
Polk & Wardwell, in remarks at the International Insolvency Institute‘s Eighth Annual International 
Insolvency Conference (June 10, 2008) (notes on file with author). 
 205. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing the assets that underlie CDO 
securities). 
 206. For an interesting conjecture on whether this indeed is anomalous, see Hellwig, supra note 3, 
at 41 (arguing that although the notion that the market value of securities may be significantly below 
the expected present value of their future cash flows ―seems incompatible with the theory of asset 
pricing in informationally efficient markets,‖ it can be explained by limitations on investor funds or 
investor worries about refinancing). 
 207. See Schwarcz, Keynote Address, supra note 3; Containing Systemic Risks and Restoring 
Financial Soundness, GLOBAL FIN. STABILITY REP. (Int‘l Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.) (Apr. 
2008) (suggesting that the market prices of at least some mortgage-backed securities may be 
significantly below the expected present values of their future cash flows). This amount could be 
measured by examining the mortgage loans underlying the securities and ascertaining which were 
subprime, which were prime, and which were delinquent or in default, and then estimating the 
expected present values of those cash flows). See Simon Gervais & Steven L. Schwarcz, Valuation of 
Risky Cash Flows (working paper, on file with author).  
 208. Cf. CRMPG III REPORT, supra note 54, at 102 (proposing that a resilient market for credit 
derivatives requires that shocks be ―absorb[ed], rather than amplify[ied]‖).  
 209. See infra notes 211–29 and accompanying text (discussing how a liquidity provider of last 
resort could more loosely couple financial-market feedback effects). For a discussion of logistical and 
cost-benefit issues associated with a liquidity provider of last resort, see infra notes 229–52 and 
accompanying text. 
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This approach takes inspiration from chaos theory,
210
 which recognizes 
that failures are almost inevitable in complex systems, and that successful 
systems are those in which the consequences of a failure are limited.
211
 
This approach is also consistent with engineering design, in which 
decoupling systems through modularity helps to reduce the chance that a 
failure in one part of a complex system will systemically trigger a failure 
in another part.
212
 ―Modularity allows complexity to become manageable 
by . . . partially closing off some parts of the system and allowing these 
encapsulated components to interconnect only in certain ways.‖213 Thus, 
when a component of a system fails, modularity enables repairs to be 
made before the entire system shuts down.
214
  
A market liquidity provider would work in much this same way, 
providing functional ―modularity‖ to limit the consequences of financial-
market failure by directly investing in securities of panicked markets. 
Financial markets rely critically on the supply of liquidity in the form of 
credit.
215
 If a failure deprives a particular market of liquidity, a market 
liquidity provider can restore liquidity before that market collapses and 
endangers other financial markets.
216
  
For example, a market liquidity provider could provide market 
liquidity
217
 by investing in securities of artificially falling financial 
 
 
 210. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (introducing chaos theory). 
 211. J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States: 
Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of 
Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405, 467–68 (1997); see also PER BAK, HOW NATURE 
WORKS: THE SCIENCE OF SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY (1996).  
 212. Charles B. Perrow, Complexity, Catastrophe, and Modularity, 78 SOC. INQUIRY 162 (2008). 
 213. Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 1175, 1180 (2006). 
 214. Id.; see also Zuoyi Zhang & Yuliang Sun, Economic Potential of Modular Reactor Nuclear 
Power Plants Based on the Chinese HTR-PM Project, NUCLEAR ENGINEERING & DESIGN 2265 (2007) 
(explaining that, after the Three-Mile Island reactor meltdown, nuclear power plants began to use 
modularity to increase safety measures against similar, nonlinear catastrophes). 
 215. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 216. Cf. Michael D. Bordo, Bruce Misrach, & Anna Schwartz, Real Versus Pseudo-International 
Systemic Risk: Some Lessons From History 19 (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
5371, 1995) (observing that financial panic will not usually become contagious when a lender of last 
resort provides adequate liquidity). In the Great Depression, for example, economists believe that the 
negative effects would have been considerably muted through actions by the government central bank 
to provide the needed liquidity to maintain stability within the monetary supply. Id. at 21. 
 217. For clarity, this discussion differentiates ―market illiquidity,‖ in which illiquidity in a market 
causes specific assets in that market to be undervalued, from ―funding illiquidity,‖ in which illiquidity 
in a market for short-term investments threatens to undermine long-term investments that are funded 
by the short-term investments. Cf. infra notes 220–22 and accompanying text (discussing funding 
liquidity). Both market illiquidity and funding illiquidity are forms of illiquidity in markets. I thank 
Laura Ellen Kodres, Chief, Global Financial Stability Division, International Monetary Fund, for 
pointing out this distinction. 
  
 
 
 
 
2009] REGULATING COMPLEXITY 249 
 
 
 
 
markets—markets in which the price of securities falls measurably below 
the intrinsic value of the assets underlying the securities (which might 
result from a panic, as occurred in the subprime crisis when mortgage-
backed securities prices fell below the present value of the expected cash 
flows on the underlying mortgages
218
). Such liquidity would help to 
stabilize asset prices and dampen the over-amplification of marking-to-
market that can lead to market collapse.
219
  
A market liquidity provider also could address temporary problems of 
funding illiquidity. This occurs when illiquidity in a market for short-term 
investments threatens to undermine long-term investments that are funded 
by the short-term investments. For example, an investment vehicle, such 
as an asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) securitization conduit,
220
 
may fund the purchase of long-term financial assets, such as bonds, by 
issuing short-term commercial paper, expecting to refinance by issuing 
new commercial paper (i.e., ―rolling over‖ the commercial paper). If the 
market for commercial paper is temporarily disrupted, as occurred during 
the subprime crisis, and the securitization conduit cannot obtain immediate 
alternative financing, it will default.
221
 In instances where market 
participants reasonably use short-term funding to invest in long-term 
assets and the market illiquidity is unexpected and temporary,
222
 a market 
 
 
 218. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. The mechanics of timing purchases will be 
critical. Because markets normally can fluctuate widely, a market liquidity provider should 
contemplate acting only when fluctuations are outside of normal ranges. 
 219. See supra notes 115–21 and 200–02 and accompanying text (discussing how marking-to-
market in turbulent financial markets can lead to market collapse). In the subprime crisis, for example, 
a market liquidity provider could have stepped in to purchase sufficient quantities of mortgage-backed 
securities to stabilize the MBS markets. Say the intrinsic value of a type of mortgage-backed 
securities, calculated by taking the present value of the expected value of the cash flows on the 
mortgage loans backing those securities, is eighty cents on the dollar. If the market price of those 
securities had fallen to, say, twenty cents on the dollar, the market liquidity provider could purchase 
these securities at, say, sixty cents on the dollar cash. But it could also agree to pay a higher ―deferred 
purchase price‖ for securities that turn out to be worth more than expected. The large discount ensures 
that the market liquidity provider, and thus taxpayers, should not lose money. And the deferred 
purchase price protects sellers from giving up, or having to write off on their books, too much value. 
See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Case for a Market Liquidity Provider of Last Resort, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & 
BUS. 346 (2009), available at http:/ssrn.com/abstract_id=1346542. For an explanation of why, if 
prices are artificially low, private investors cannot be counted on to invest and make this profit, see 
infra notes 244–50 and accompanying text. 
 220. For a brief primer on ABCP securitization conduits, see Michael Durrer, Asset Backed 
Commercial Paper Conduits, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 119, 119 (1997). 
 221. The President‘s Working Group on Financial Markets Policy Statement on Financial Market 
Developments, 14 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 447, 455–56 (2008) [hereinafter Policy Statement] 
(suggesting that some thirty percent contraction of the ABCP market in the U.S. in 2007 was a factor 
contributing to the financial crisis). 
 222. The conditions that the use of short-term funding to invest in long-term assets be reasonable 
and that any market illiquidity be unexpected are intended to minimize moral hazard. See infra note 
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liquidity provider could consider providing the alternative financing.
223
  
In these ways, a market liquidity provider not only would reduce the 
chance of any given financial market collapse by restoring liquidity but 
also would reduce systemic risk by decoupling the chance that a failure in 
one market would trigger a failure in other markets.
224
  
These roles of a market liquidity provider go substantially beyond the 
U.S. Federal Reserve‘s (the ―Fed‖) historical actions as lender of last 
resort to financial institutions, much less the actions of other national 
central banks. Under the Federal Reserve Act, the Federal Reserve Bank is 
authorized to, and customarily does, offer loans to banks that need 
credit.
225
 In response to the subprime crisis, the Federal Reserve extended 
its lending availability to ―near banks‖ like investment banks.226 If needed, 
the Fed even has power to extend lending availability to any entity, not 
merely banks and near banks, whose failure might bring down the larger 
financial system.
227
 The extent of the Fed‘s power, much less its 
 
 
236 and accompanying text.  
 223. Cf. Hellwig, supra note 3, at 39:  
Short of buying the securities themselves, the central-bank intervention [in the subprime 
crisis] could not eliminate the systemic problem that, with the breakdown of conduit and SIV 
refinancing, there was a large overhang of long-term asset-backed securities that needed 
refinancing at a time when the fundamental value of these assets was questionable and the 
associated risks were seen as a potential threat to any institution that was holding them. 
Id. The ability to invest directly in market securities can also protect the integrity of secondary markets 
for re-sale of securities. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 3, at 225–28. 
 224. Cf. supra notes 212–16 and accompanying text (referring to this as functional modularity).  
 225. See, e.g., Christopher Anstey & Steve Matthews, Fed‟s Direct Loans to Banks Climb to 
Record Level (Update 2), BLOOMBERG, May 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20670001&sid=aur2QcWbKf2U. Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. § 343) enables 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, in ―unusual and exigent circumstances,‖ to 
―authorize any Federal reserve bank . . . to discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, 
notes, drafts, and bills of exchange‖ if such individual, partnership, or corporation is ―unable to secure 
adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions.‖ The publicity about the original 
―liquidity injections‖ by the Federal Reserve in response to the subprime crisis did not represent direct 
increases in money availability but merely a lowering of the ―discount rate‖ at which such loans are 
made, thereby providing a more attractive borrowing environment for banks. See, e.g., Jeremy W. 
Peters, The Banks Roll Up Their Sleeves, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, at 2 (observing that when the 
Federal Reserve makes ―liquidity injections‖ into the banking system, ―the Fed doesn‘t even use real 
money,‖ and explaining that liquidity results from offering Fed loans to banks at the discount rate, a 
lower interest rate than the ―fed funds rate‖ that banks would charge other banks on interbank loans). 
Moreover, that ―liquidity injection‖ affected only banks, not non-banks or financial markets. See Kim 
Clark, Fed „Injections‟: Who Benefits?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 15, 2007, http://www.usnew. 
com/usnews/biztech/articles/070815/15blinder.htm (explaining that the Fed is merely ―lending to 
banks that need the funds and charging them interest‖); Peters, supra, at 2 (discussing the Federal 
Reserve‘s ability to ―inject‖ liquidity by lending money to banks so that they do not have to borrow 
elsewhere at higher interest rates). 
 226. Systemic Risk and the Financial Markets: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Ben Bernake, Federal Reserve Chairman). 
 227. See supra note 225 (referencing Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which enables the 
  
 
 
 
 
2009] REGULATING COMPLEXITY 251 
 
 
 
 
willingness, to provide liquidity to markets directly has been less clear, 
however.  
Adaptation in that direction is critical, though, because of the ongoing 
shift (known as ―disintermediation‖) of the source of corporate financing 
from banks to financial and capital markets.
228
 This Article‘s conception of 
a market liquidity provider would take on this new role of protecting these 
markets directly. Had such a market liquidity provider been in existence 
when the subprime crisis started, the resulting collapse of the credit 
markets may well have been restricted in scope and lessened in impact.
229
  
The above discussion raises the question of whether these potential 
benefits of using a market liquidity provider would exceed its costs. As 
shown below, a market liquidity provider should generate relatively 
minimal costs, and certainly lower costs than those of a lender of last 
resort to institutions.
230
 In related contexts, I have shown the relevant costs 
to be taxpayer expense and moral hazard.
231
 By providing a lifeline to 
financial institutions, a lender of last resort fosters moral hazard by 
potentially encouraging these institutions—especially those that believe 
 
 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, in ―unusual and exigent circumstances,‖ to 
―authorize any Federal reserve bank . . . to discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, 
notes, drafts, and bills of exchange‖) (emphasis added). 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2008). 
 228. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 3, at 200. Cf. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, No Time to Lose, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 2009, at 80 (observing that securitization ―once accounted for 
seventy percent of our credit while conventional bank lending had dropped to thirty percent. Unless 
financial firms can securitize debt and, in turn, rely on investors willing to buy [securities representing] 
the bundled loans, credit will remain extremely tight.‖). 
 229. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 3, at 229, 248–49; see also supra notes 218–19 and 
accompanying text. I do not propose that existing safety nets be discarded. This Article‘s conception of 
a market liquidity provider of last resort would supplement, not replace, a lender of last resort. The 
combination, however, would be synergistic: by stabilizing financial markets, a market liquidity 
provider not only would preserve credit but also would minimize the likelihood that institutions 
invested in those markets will ultimately fail—thereby reducing the times when a lender of last resort 
would be needed. 
 230. Another way to help transform our tightly coupled financial system into one that is more 
weakly coupled would be to require near banks, see supra note 226 and accompanying text (defining 
―near banks‖), to maintain minimum capital requirements, like banks. Capital requirements, however, 
are very expensive. See, e.g., Raj Bhala, Applying Equilibrium Theory and the Ficas Model: A Case 
Study of Capital Adequacy and Currency Trading, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 125, 132 (1996) (―[T]he 
greater the capital requirements, the more expensive it is to trade in the markets . . . .‖); Michael E. 
Bleier, Operational Risk in Basel II, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 101, 103–04 (2004) (―The new capital 
requirement for operational risk can be fairly expensive for specialized financial institutions with 
significant concentration in asset management, custody, and other businesses that would, for the first 
time carry a capital requirement.‖). 
 231. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 3, at 225–30; Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 961–66 (2000). 
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they are ―too big to fail‖—to be fiscally reckless.232 Moreover, loans made 
to these institutions will not be repaid if the institutions eventually fail.  
In contrast, a market liquidity provider, especially if it acts at the outset 
of a market panic, can profitably invest in securities at a deep discount 
from the original market price and still provide a ―floor‖ to how low the 
market will drop.
233
 Indeed, this Article proposes that a market liquidity 
provider should consider providing market liquidity only when it believes 
it can profit (or at least break even) because its mission should be to 
correct market failures, such as might be caused by a panic or other 
investor overreaction.
234
 Moral hazard should also be minimized: 
speculative investors will be hurt by the market liquidity provider‘s deeply 
discounted purchases,
235
 and investing in markets, not institutions directly, 
should reduce rent-seeking behavior by institutions that believe they are 
too big to be allowed to fail.
236
 Additionally, by stabilizing financial 
markets, a market liquidity provider will minimize the likelihood that 
institutions investing or insuring risk in those markets will ultimately fail, 
further reducing the times when a lender of last resort would be needed. If 
financial markets had not broken down, for example, institutions like Bear 
Stearns, AIG, and Citigroup would not have needed to be bailed out.
237
 In 
 
 
 232. See, e.g., GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK 
BAILOUTS (2004); Robert L. Hetzel, Too Big to Fail: Origins, Consequences, and Outlook, FED. RES. 
BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1991, at 3. Although ideally a lender of last resort 
should adopt a policy of ―constructive ambiguity‖ in its lending decisions and further restrict its 
lending to entities that are merely experiencing temporary liquidity crises but that otherwise are 
financially healthy, Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 3, at 226–27, these restrictions may not be 
politically viable if the entity‘s failure would negatively impact the real economy. See Finance and 
Economics: Not Yet the Last Resort, ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2008, at 108 (asserting that ―the political 
risks of doing too little and letting the economy slide‖ may outweigh restrictions on loans by the Fed).  
 233. See supra notes 218–23 and accompanying text (explaining why, in the subprime crisis, a 
market liquidity provider could have profitably purchased mortgage-backed securities at a deep 
discount and still have stabilized the market significantly above the present disastrous levels). 
 234. See supra notes 216–19 and infra notes 245–46 and accompanying text.  
 235. Investor moral hazard can be further limited if the market liquidity provider adopts a policy 
of constructive ambiguity, not stating ex ante whether or not it will attempt to stabilize any given 
market panic and not indicating in advance the purchase price it would offer if it were to attempt to do 
so. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 3, at 226–27. Investor moral hazard cannot be eliminated, 
however, because certain markets may be so important that investors can predict their stabilization 
with a high degree of certainty. 
 236. In contrast, a market liquidity provider used to finance temporary problems of funding 
illiquidity, see supra notes 219–23 and accompanying text, could increase moral hazard to the extent 
market participants use less care in addressing funding gaps. This Article‘s proposal—that a market 
liquidity provider consider providing such financing only when market participants have reasonably 
used short-term funding to invest in long-term assets and the subsequent market illiquidity is 
unexpected—is intended to minimize that moral hazard. See supra note 222.  
 237. Schwarcz, Keynote Address, supra note 3, at 553 (explaining that the collapse in financial-
market prices meant that banks and other financial institutions holding securities in those markets had 
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economic terms, therefore, any safety net subsidies created by a market 
liquidity provider will be much smaller than those created by a lender of 
last resort.
238
 
Perhaps for these reasons, the United States Department of the 
Treasury, responding to the possible collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, announced in September 2008 that it would purchase securities 
issued by Fannie and Freddie to the extent investors do not do so, thereby 
stabilizing the mortgage-backed securities markets and reducing mortgage 
rates.
239
 This was the first time that any government entity agreed to act in 
a market-liquidity-provider capacity.
240
 
 
 
to write down their value, causing these institutions to appear more financially risky, in turn triggering 
lack of confidence and concern over counterparty risk).  
 238. Cf. Caprio, Demirguc-Kunt & Kane, supra note 178, at 9 (arguing that the goal of financial 
regulation and supervision is ―to manage the [regulatory] safety net so that private risk-taking is 
neither taxed nor subsidized‖); id. at 6 (arguing that, ideally, regulated parties should not have 
opportunities to ―shift the deep downside of their risk exposures onto the [regulatory] safety net‖).  
 239. Henry M. Paulson, Secretary of the Treasury, United States Department of the Treasury, 
Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers, 
Statement to the Press (Sept. 7, 2008). Although this was one of four steps announced by Secretary 
Paulson to address the problems of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the other steps—placing these 
entities into conservatorship, committing to purchase senior-priority preferred stock in these entities to 
maintain a positive net worth, and establishing a secured lending credit facility for these entities—
would have no application to stabilizing financial markets generally.  
 240. More recently, the United States has tried to restore market confidence by ―provid[ing] direct 
financing to businesses by buying three-month commercial paper . . . [and] provid[ing] loans to banks 
and other financial institutions that buy asset-backed commercial paper from money-market mutual 
funds.‖ Michael M. Grynbaum, Moves to Shore Up More Funds, Ensuring Safety of Money Markets, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, at B9. Similarly, the U.S. government‘s Term Asset-Backed Securities 
Loan Facility, or TALF, contemplates investing government funds in certain consumer-asset-backed 
securities to reduce consumer financing costs, although its results are not yet known. The original 
Troubled Assets Relief Program, or ―TARP,‖ under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008 had contemplated government purchases of mortgage-backed securities, at least partly for the 
purpose of stabilizing market prices, at a price above the collapsed ―market‖ price but discounted from 
what the securities are intrinsically worth. The TARP plan, however, ran into immediate political 
hurdles based on misunderstanding the distinction between market price and intrinsic value. Because 
the purchase price paid by the government would have to be above ―market‖ to avoid even further 
counterparty write-offs, there was a populist perception that the government would be unjustifiably 
bailing out Wall Street. See, e.g., Mortimer B. Zuckerman, We Deserve a Better Bailout, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Oct. 20, 2008, at 79 (arguing that buying the MBS at above-market prices ―provide[s] a 
huge, unjustified bailout of Wall Street‖ by ―rescu[ing] the financial industry from the consequences of 
its own misjudgments, profligacy, and greed‖). Partly for these reasons, and partly because economists 
misjudged (in my opinion) the accounting and legal feasibility of purchasing securities directly, TARP 
money was ultimately used mostly to purchase priority equity interests in troubled financial 
institutions. Those purchases did little, however, to stabilize financial markets. Cf. Alan S. Blinder, 
Missing the Target With $700 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at BU 4 (arguing that the TARP‘s 
rationales for buying MBS included establishing objective valuations and restarting the markets for 
these securities, thereby revitalizing mortgage finance, and that using TARP funds to buy equity in 
banks rather than MBS ―wasted a precious resource,‖ likening such misuse to ―another disaster‖ like 
the Iraq war and the response to Hurricane Katrina).  
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One might ask whether failed efforts of governments to try to control 
their currency exchange rates indicate that a market liquidity provider, 
even if governmental, would have insufficient spending power to stabilize 
irrationally panicked debt markets. Only Hong Kong was able to control 
its currency exchange rate, and that was because its reserves—which 
implicitly included all of China‘s reserves—were large enough to be 
credible.
241
 There are important distinctions, though, between controlling a 
currency exchange rate and stabilizing an irrationally panicked debt 
market. Controlling a currency exchange rate depends on all of the 
macroeconomic factors to which the country in question is subject, 
whereas stabilizing a panicked debt market depends mostly on factors 
specific to the debt securities in question. Also, because the market 
liquidity provider should consider acting only when a panicked debt 
market is so irrational that the market value of its securities falls 
measurably below their intrinsic value,
242
 the market liquidity provider 
should be able to stem the information asymmetry leading to this valuation 
differential by explaining the irrationality and, by buying at an above-
market price, putting its money where its mouth is.
243
 It effectively would 
be providing to investors in that debt market the same type of real 
credibility and comfort that a country‘s large reserves provide to currency 
investors.
244
 
 
 
 241. Mark L. Clifford, Hong Kong‟s Currency Cop; Joseph Yam‟s Duty: Defend the Dollar 
Against All Comers, BUS. WK., Sept. 23, 1996, at 60 (discussing Hong Kong‘s currency controls and 
China‘s tacit approval thereof). 
 242. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text. The market liquidity provider also could act 
to prevent funding illiquidity, but the amounts needed for that purpose should be relatively small.  
 243. The ability of a market liquidity provider to stabilize market prices might have particular 
problems in a thin market that does not react responsively to its purchases. In the subprime crisis, for 
example, at least a portion of the MBS markets, including those for ABS CDO securities, were 
privately-placed debt markets. Nonetheless, there was a virtual market for ABS CDO securities, 
created by the ABX.HE indices. This virtual market was sufficiently large that it should have reacted 
responsively to purchases made by a market liquidity provider. (The ABX.HE indices simulate the risk 
and reward of trading in asset- and mortgage-backed securities. A potential investor, for example, can 
decide to invest in asset-backed securities represented by one of the indices, without actually 
purchasing the underlying securities. The investor is thus not limited to specific securities, or to 
amounts of those securities that are actually physically available for purchase. The ABX.HE indices 
also help to facilitate hedging. A lender, dealer, or hedge fund with excessive asset-backed securities 
exposure, for example, not only can attempt to buy protection from counterparties but now can also 
hedge its exposure through the indices.) Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of 
Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405, 415 (2007) (―[S]waps written on indexes give the protection 
buyer a hedge against a pool of representative debtors with similar credit profiles.‖); see also Aaron 
Unterman, Innovative Destruction—Structured Finance and Credit Market Reform in the Bubble Era, 
5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53, 70 (2009) (describing the ABX index). 
 244. Any analogy of a market liquidity provider to The Bank of Japan‘s failed attempt to support 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange‘s Nikkei index would also be inappropriate. The Nikkei is an index of 
shares of 225 companies selected to be representative of the Tokyo Stock Exchange as a whole and 
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One also might ask why, if a market liquidity provider can invest in 
securities at a deep discount to stabilize markets and still make money, 
private investors will not also do so. Part of the answer is that individuals 
at investing firms may not want to jeopardize their reputations (and jobs) 
by causing their firms to invest at a time when other investors have 
abandoned the market.
245
 Empirical evidence confirms that individuals 
engage in this type of ―herd behavior.‖246 Private investors are also risk 
averse,
247
 and the fact that disclosure has become so complex that 
investors are uncertain how much securities are worth increases the 
perception, if not reality, of risk. Private investors also would have greater 
real risk if—as almost certainly would be the case—the size of their 
investment is insufficient to ensure market stabilization. They then face 
the risk that a continuing fall in market prices could systemically impact 
the real economy (such as by shutting down credit markets, as occurred in 
the subprime crisis), thereby jeopardizing even the intrinsic value of their 
purchased securities.
248
 Furthermore, even if they are confident that the 
intrinsic value of the purchased securities exceeds the amount of their 
investment,
249
 they may not want to risk having to wait until maturity of 
the securities to profit.
250
 A market liquidity provider with the ability to 
 
 
thus the price of those shares turns on a multitude of macroeconomic factors, including Japan‘s 
financial condition. 
 245. See, e.g., Tyler Cowen, It‟s Hard to Thaw a Frozen Market, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at 
BU 5 (asking why, in the context of the subprime crisis, ―asset prices don‘t simply fall enough so that 
someone buys them and trading picks up again‖; and answering, ―why seek ‗fire sale‘ prices when you 
might lose your job for doing so?‖). 
 246. Cf. Paul M. Healy & Krishna Palepu, Governance and Intermediation Problems in Capital 
Markets: Evidence from the Fall of Enron 26 (NAT‘L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, Working Paper 
No. 02-27, 2002) (observing that fund manager who estimates a stock is overvalued but does not act on 
this analysis ―and simply follows the crowd . . . will not be rewarded for foreseeing the problems . . . 
but neither will he be blamed for a poor investment decision when the stock ultimately crashes, since 
his peers made the same mistake‖); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral 
Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1038 (2000) (discussing how herd behavior may have a 
reputational payoff even if the chosen course of action fails, and arguing that where ―the action was 
consistent with approved conventional wisdom, the hit to the manager‘s reputation from an adverse 
outcome is reduced‖). 
 247. JONATHAN BERK & PETER DEMARZO, CORPORATE FINANCE 68–69 (2007). 
 248. Recall that intrinsic value of mortgage-backed securities is measured by first examining 
which mortgage loans underlying those securities are subprime, which are prime, and which are 
delinquent or in default. See supra note 207. If an obligor on a previously prime mortgage loan loses 
her job because the real economy is impacted, that loan may become delinquent or defaulted and, in 
any event, should likely be recategorized as subprime, thereby reducing its intrinsic value.  
 249. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 250. This risk is exacerbated if the market value of undervalued securities is still falling, because 
investors then would not even break even on near-term resale of the securities. Cf. Kravitt, supra note 
15, at 16 (―Who wants to buy securities that will have to be marked down tomorrow, even if one 
expects them to be worth more eventually?‖). 
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invest sufficiently large amounts to stabilize markets and also, if 
necessary, to wait until maturity is needed to correct these market failures. 
It should be noted, however, that a market liquidity provider need not 
necessarily have to invest government funds, at least at the outset, to 
correct these market failures. Rather than purchasing securities directly, a 
market liquidity provider could take a more targeted approach to 
stabilizing panicked markets by entering into derivatives contracts to strip 
out risks that the market has the greatest difficulty hedging—in effect, the 
market‘s irrationality element—thereby stimulating private investment. 
The Obama Administration in the United States has been considering this 
type of public-private-partnership approach in its revised financial bailout 
plan.
251
 By not actually purchasing securities directly, a market liquidity 
provider would appear to be taking less investment risk and, thus, its 
function may be seen as more politically acceptable.
252
 
C. Addressing Failures Arising from Misalignment 
Complexity causes several types of misalignment that can give rise to 
financial-market failures.
253
 Consider first misalignment caused by the 
originate-to-distribute model, which can lead to moral hazard (in turn, said 
to cause lax lending standards) and collective-action problems.
254
 Because 
this model is critical to the funding liquidity of banks
255
 and 
 
 
 251. Cf. Floyd Norris, U.S. Bank Bailout to Rely in Part on Private Money, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 
2009, at A1 (reporting that the revised bailout plan would likely depend in part on private investors, 
such as hedge funds, private-equity funds, and perhaps insurance companies, buying distressed MBS, 
with the U.S. Government guaranteeing a floor value to the securities purchased). 
 252. Cf. id. (observing that having the government purchase the distressed MBS securities directly 
would be a ―politically perilous course‖). The concept of a market liquidity provider of last resort 
could raise other issues, such as whether its purchases could have inflationary effects or expose 
taxpayers to too much risk. If, for example, a market liquidity provider obtains funds to purchase 
securities directly or indirectly from the Federal Reserve (or a foreign central bank), the government in 
effect might be printing money to make the purchases—which could be viewed as a form of 
―quantitative easing,‖ which could spark inflation. There also may be concern whether the very 
existence of a market liquidity provider could, inadvertently, make falling markets even less stable (as 
where parties anticipating market-liquidity-provider stabilization of a falling market wait to invest in 
market securities, even if they believe the securities are undervalued, until they see the price offered by 
the market liquidity provider). I address these and other concerns in my forthcoming paper, Too Big To 
Fail?: Recasting the Financial Safety Net (forthcoming in THE PANIC OF 2008), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1352563. 
 253. Cf. supra note 147 (noting that this Article does not cover all types of conflicts that could 
cause market failure, just those that result from complexity). 
 254. See supra notes 29–35 and accompanying text. 
 255. See, e.g., Joseph R. Mason, Powerpoint presentation to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland at its workshop on Structured Finance and Loan Modification, Mortgage Loan 
Modification: Promises and Pitfalls (Nov. 20, 2007) (showing that fifty-eight percent of mortgage 
liquidity in the United States, and seventy-five percent of mortgage liquidity in California, has come 
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corporations,
256
 this Article assumes the model will continue 
notwithstanding its complexity. The Article explores possible solutions on 
that basis.
257
 
The moral hazard problem arises because the originate-to-distribute 
model misaligns the interests of the lenders with the interests of the 
ultimate owners of the loans.
258
 In theory, separation of origination and 
ownership should not matter because ultimate owners should assess and 
value risk before buying their ownership positions.
259
 Even though lenders 
are better situated to make this evaluation than the ultimate owners, the 
latter should take steps to reduce, or to compensate for, this information 
asymmetry.
260
 The subprime crisis demonstrates, however, that practice 
can diverge from theory in this context because of the complexity of 
disclosure, the tendency of investors to engage in herd behavior, and the 
possible excessive diversification of risk that undermines any given 
investor‘s incentive to monitor and see the big picture.261  
As one solution to the moral hazard problem caused by this 
misalignment, regulators could require loan originators to retain some 
realistic risk of loss.
262
 This solution, though, would still face the mutual-
misinformation problem.
263
 The solution also would not necessarily apply 
to mortgage- and other loan-brokers, who sometimes work with banks and 
finance companies to help make loans to borrowers.
264
 Because these 
 
 
from structured finance, which relies on the originate-to-distribute model). 
 256. See Xudong An, Yongheng Deng & Stuart A. Gabriel, Value Creation Through 
Securitization: Evidence from the CMBS Market 3 (SSRN Working Paper No. 1095645, 2008) 
(concluding that despite the recent mortgage crisis, securitizing financial assets through the originate-
to-distribute model has created value in the financial markets). 
 257. Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 775, 776–77 (1988) (grafting a normative analysis onto a positive assumption, in that case taking 
the existence of corporate reorganizations in bankruptcy law as a given to put forth a suggestion to 
improve the reorganization process). 
 258. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 259. Cf. Policy Statement, supra note 221, at 451–52, 455 (recommending that investors normally 
make informed decisions about risk, but noting that in the subprime crisis investors over-relied on 
ratings instead of engaging in their own independent credit analysis because the securities were so 
complex). 
 260. Id. at 451–52. 
 261. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Cf. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, 
supra note 1 (examining why investors purchasing mortgage-backed securities failed to properly 
analyze disclosures or to police behavior of lenders and issuers). 
 262. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 388. Cf. INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISK AND 
RESTORING FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS 81 (Apr. 2008), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/01/ 
index.htm (stating that the originate-to-distribute model creates moral hazard by relieving the 
originator of any risk of loss once the loan is sold). 
 263. See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text. 
 264. A mortgage broker markets mortgage loans and brings lenders and borrowers together. 
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―brokers‖ earn a fee by arranging the loans without putting any of their 
own funds at risk, they have little incentive to rigorously police credit 
standards.
265
 To the extent mortgage-broker participation causes lending 
standards to fall, however, that would be a somewhat straightforward 
―agency-cost‖ problem for lenders to solve. 
Misalignment caused by the originate-to-distribute model also can 
create a collective-action problem when the ultimate owners of the loans 
are widely dispersed. This problem manifests itself most clearly in loan 
servicing.
266
 Theoretically, this problem should be able to be alleviated by 
hiring competent ―servicers‖ to service the loans on behalf of the owners, 
and indeed typical transactional documentation
267
 provides for hiring a 
servicer to act on behalf of the investors who beneficially own the loans.
268
  
In the subprime crisis, however, hiring servicers did not always solve 
the collective-action problem. Although servicers usually retained power, 
acting ―in the best interests‖ of the investors in the mortgage-backed 
securities, to restructure the underlying mortgage loans,
269
 in practice 
servicers were reluctant to engage in restructuring. There was uncertainty 
whether the servicer‘s costs of engaging in a restructuring would be 
reimbursed, whereas all foreclosure costs are reimbursed.
270
 More 
significantly, servicers often preferred foreclosure over restructuring 
because the former is more ministerial and, thus, has lower litigation 
risk.
271
 The litigation risk was exacerbated in the subprime crisis by the 
fact that, in many cases, cash flows deriving from principal and interest on 
the mortgages were separately allocated to different investor classes, or 
―tranches,‖ of the securities.272 A restructuring that, for example, reduced 
 
 
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 206 (8th ed. 2004). Compare Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 598 P.2d 45, 
50 (Cal. 1979) (―A mortgage loan broker is customarily retained by a borrower to act as the borrower‘s 
agent in negotiating an acceptable loan.‖) with 24 C.F.R. § 3500.7(a)(4)–(b) (2008) (describing a 
mortgage broker as a lender‘s agent). 
 265. Cf. Alan S. Blinder, The Case for a Newer Deal, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2008. 
 266. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 267. This is usually in the so-called ―pooling and servicing agreement.‖ 
 268. It is also typical for originators of mortgage loans, or a specialized servicing company such 
as Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, to act as the servicer for a fee. JAMES A. ROSENTHAL & 
JUAN M. OCAMPO, SECURITIZATION OF CREDIT: INSIDE THE NEW TECHNOLOGY OF FINANCE 49–51 
(1988) (explaining the general structure of a grantor trust when the originator of asset-backed 
securities services the pool of assets); Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide Is Upbeat Despite Loss, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2007, at C1 (reporting that Countrywide is the nation‘s largest loan servicer).  
 269. Gretchen Morgenson, More Home Foreclosures Loom as Owners Face Mortgage Maze, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at A1.  
 270. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 392–93. 
 271. Id. at 393. 
 272. Jon D. Van Gorp, Capital Markets Dispersion of Subprime Mortgage Risk 7–8 (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
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the interest rate would adversely affect investors in the interest-only 
tranche,
273
 leading to what some have called ―tranche warfare.‖274 
Regulation may well be needed to address the servicing problem in 
existing transactions, where the underlying deal documentation is already 
in place.
275
 But future deal documentation would be expected to address 
the problem without the need for regulation—such as by including clearer 
and more flexible servicing guidelines, more certain reimbursement 
procedures for loan restructuring (when the servicer determines that 
restructuring is superior to foreclosure), and contractual immunity from 
liability for servicers that act in good faith. 
Misalignment can also cause failure in the form of fraud.
276
 This 
Article has shown that current best-practice monitoring procedures in 
asset-backed securities transactions are not fail-safe because the servicer is 
not usually independent of the company originating the underlying 
financial assets.
277
 An affiliated servicer can manipulate monitoring in 
ways that are undetectable unless investors, or their agents, micromanage 
all uses and sources of cash,
278
 which might not be cost effective. 
Misalignment that facilitates fraud can be addressed either by using a 
servicer independent of the company if there is any doubt of the servicer‘s 
integrity, or by allowing investors or their agents to micromanage the uses 
and sources of cash. Because the servicer of the financial assets effectively 
manages uses and sources of cash collections from those assets, the most 
 
 
 273. The conflicts among tranches can become even more complicated because CDO and ABS 
CDO securities sometimes also include prepayment-penalty tranches, and the different tranches ―have 
different priorities relative to one another for the purpose of absorbing losses and prepayments on the 
underlying subprime mortgage loans.‖ Id. at 8. 
 274. Hirsch, supra note 38 (describing tranche conflicts as a significant reason why servicers 
choose foreclosure over restructuring). The term, ―tranche warfare,‖ was originally coined in Kurt 
Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course 
Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 563 (2002). 
 275. Regulatory changes that are subsidized in whole or part by government, however, could 
foster moral hazard, potentially making future homeowners more willing to take risks when 
borrowing. One regulatory change I would favor is to grant servicers the same type of business-
judgment rule limited immunity from lawsuits that corporate directors presently enjoy, as a means to 
motivate servicers to exercise their judgment in good faith without fear of liability. Cf. Steven L. 
Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of the Indenture Trustee, 59 ALA. L. 
REV. 1037 (2008) (advocating this type of limited immunity for indenture trustees on public debt 
issues). 
 276. Misalignment also can result in a collective-action problem to the extent the originate-to-
distribute model makes the size of any given loan-owner‘s investment so small that it deprives owners 
of the incentive to engage in due diligence and monitoring. MARK ADELSON, MBS BASICS (Nomura 
Sec. Int‘l 2006). This Article‘s proposal to require loan originators to retain some material exposure to 
risk, however, would help to solve this collective-action problem. 
 277. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra notes 101–05 and accompanying text. 
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straightforward solution when in doubt of the servicer‘s integrity is to use 
an independent servicer.
279
  
In practice, asset-backed securities transactions may evolve in the 
direction of more frequently using independent, third-party servicers to 
increase investor comfort.
280
 This evolution is likely to be gradual because, 
at least currently, few independent parties have the needed servicing 
expertise and experience to cost-effectively perform in this capacity.
281
 
Nonetheless, there is evidence that the market is beginning to respond 
(such as the decision by Bank of America to purchase Countrywide 
Financial Corp.) partly in order to gain ―greater scale in . . . servicing 
mortgages.‖282  
If the market takes steps to correct itself in this manner, there should be 
no need for regulation requiring the use of independent servicers. Indeed, 
parties should have the flexibility to decide not to use independent 
servicers where they trust a servicer affiliated with the company 
originating the financial assets. There is nothing intrinsically wrong or 
unusual for parties in business transactions to deal with each other on the 
basis of trust.
283
 And some transactions may be beneficial, even taking into 
 
 
 279. It will be interesting also to observe the extent to which investors gain comfort where the 
company is represented by a large, prominent, and highly respected law firm. The most agreed upon 
scholarly understanding of the value added by transactional lawyers is that, as repeat players in the 
transactional world, they add value by renting their good reputation to clients. This thesis of 
transactional lawyers as ―reputational intermediaries‖ was first advanced in Ronald Gilson, Value 
Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984); see also Peter 
J. Gardner, A Role for the Business Attorney in the Twenty-First Century: Adding Value to the Client‟s 
Enterprise in the Knowledge Economy, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 17, 46–48 (2003); Karl S. 
Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 43 (1995). The rationale is that the 
high-reputation law firm bonds itself to good performance, losing at least part of its reputation if it 
fails to perform well. Indeed, a high-reputation law firm adds the greatest relative value when the 
client does not already have a high reputation. 
 280. Cf. People v. Serv. Inst., Inc., 421 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Court Suffolk County 1979) (holding 
that transactions in which defendant purchased a funeral home‘s accounts receivable at a discount and 
subject to repurchase by the funeral home and subject to further payments of service charges if the 
accounts were not repurchased within sixty days constituted loans at a rate of interest in excess of 
twenty-five percent per annum subject to usury law); SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 
47, § 4:5, at 4–9 (citing Lloyds & Scottish Fin. Ltd. v. Cyril Lord Carpets Sales Ltd., H.L. (Mar. 29, 
1979)). 
 281. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 282. Press Release, Bank of America, Bank of America Agrees to Purchase Countrywide 
Financial Corp. (Jan. 11, 2008). 
 283. Cf. Thierry Volery & Stan Mensik, The Role of Trust in Creating Effective Alliances: A 
Managerial Perspective, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 987 (1998) (observing that trust plays a crucial role in 
creating and managing alliances because it reduces complex realities far more quickly and 
economically than prediction, authority, or bargaining). 
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account the increased possibility of fraud absent an independent 
servicer.
284
  
The potential to ultimately impose this regulation might nonetheless be 
valuable. In the current financial environment, investors may call for 
independent servicers, but investors tend to have short memories. 
Experience has shown that once a crisis recedes in memory, they will 
almost always tend to ―go for the gold.‖285 There may come a time when 
regulation, or its threat, is needed to restore market discipline.
286
 
Finally, misalignment can cause failure when conflicts exist among a 
firm‘s managers—such as when investment analysts resort to simplifying 
heuristics when analyzing highly complex securities
287
 or manipulate 
models for their pecuniary advantage.
288
 This can be addressed by better 
aligning management compensation incentives with the long-term interests 
of the firm
289—such as retroactively recovering compensation paid to 
managers or paying a portion of compensation contingently over time or in 
the form of equity securities with long-term lock-down constraints on 
selling the securities.
290
 Better alignment of compensation and firm 
interests also would have mitigated a similar problem of misalignment in 
 
 
 284. Cf. supra note 155 (discussing cost-benefit analysis).  
 285. Larry Light, Bondholder Beware: Value Subject to Change Without Notice, BUS. WK., Mar. 
29, 1993, at 34 (―Bondholders can—and will—fuss all they like. But the reality is, their options are 
limited: higher returns or better protection. Most investors will continue to go for the gold.‖; 
discussing, in the context of but several years after the ―Marriott split,‖ that investors favor higher 
interest rates over ―event risk‖ covenants once examples of events justifying the covenants have 
receded in memory, even though they could reoccur). Psychologists label the tendency of people to 
overestimate the frequency or likelihood of an event when examples of, or associations with, similar 
events are easily brought to mind as the availability heuristic. Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah 
Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 465 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
 286. Cf. supra notes 171–88 and accompanying text. 
 287. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
 288. See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text (discussing how investment analysts 
manipulated VaR modeling). Cf. Hu, supra note 3, at 1492 (discussing how a trader ―engaged in 
derivatives operations may emphasize rewards and downplay risks‖). 
 289. Cf. CRMPG III REPORT, supra note 54, at 5 (observing that ―more can be done to ensure that 
incentives associated with compensation are better aligned with risk taking and risk tolerance across 
broad classes of senior and executive management‖). Sections 111(b)(2)(A)–(C) of the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343 (2008) requires, in a limited context, that 
firms take a more long-term view to compensation to avoid conflicts in the way that managers are 
paid, receiving high compensations and bonuses for arranging deals or investments that later fail. 
 290. See Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse, supra note 147, at 13 (examining these 
compensation alternatives in detail); cf. Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 119, 159–60 (2006) (citing Tom Johnson, The 2005 All-America Research 
Team, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 1, 2005, at 54, 81) (―Sell-side analysts, for example, are 
generally not compensated based solely on investment performance. Buy-side firms rate, and 
presumably pay, sell-side analysts based on factors other than performance, including timeliness of 
information, responsiveness, innovation, and comprehensibility of research reports.‖). 
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hedge funds; certain losses of institutional investors in the subprime crisis 
appear to have resulted from losses in CDO investments by controlled or 
managed hedge funds.
291
 Because managers of those hedge funds were 
paid according to hedge-fund industry custom, in which ―fund managers 
reap large rewards on the upside without a correspondingly punitive 
downside,‖292 they had significant conflicts of interest with the institutions 
owning the funds. 
Firms have incentives, and are in a better position than government 
regulators, to determine how best to align their long-term interests with 
manager compensation. Alignment is difficult to achieve, however, 
because individual firms that attempt to align incentives will be 
disadvantaged in their ability to compete for the best managers.
293
 
Regulation may well be needed to help resolve this collective-action 
problem.
294
  
D. Regulatory Lessons 
The foregoing analysis has shown that market participants themselves 
can, and indeed should have incentives to, address many of the market 
failures resulting from complexity. For example, market participants 
should have incentives to charge uncertainty premiums,
295
 to draft 
servicing agreements with clearer and more flexible servicing 
guidelines,
296
 to demand the use of independent third-party servicers,
297
 
and to require that loan originators retain a realistic risk exposure.
298
 The 
analysis also has shown that unnecessary regulation should be avoided to 
minimize unintended, often adverse, consequences.
299
  
 
 
 291. Kate Kelly, Serena Ng & David Reilly, Two Big Funds At Bear Stearns Face Shutdown—As 
Rescue Plan Falters Amid Subprime Woes, Merrill Asserts Claims, WALL. ST. J., June 20, 2007, at A1. 
 292. James Surowiecki, Performance-Pay Perplexes, NEW YORKER, Nov. 12, 2007, at 34.  
 293. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse, supra note 147, at 17. 
 294. Id. 
 295. See supra note 164 and accompanying text; William W. Bratton, The Academic Tournament 
Over Executive Compensation, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1557, 1561 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & 
JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
(2004), which argues that corporate governance structures empower top managers to use their power 
over directors to extract rents described as incentive pay). 
 296. See supra notes 275–76 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra notes 278–84 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra notes 258–65 and accompanying text (through holding open a solution under 
which regulators require loan originators to retain that risk exposure). 
 299. See supra notes 115–16 and 161–63 and accompanying text. Indeed, chaos theory suggests 
that one unintended consequence of overregulation is that by preventing small financial-market 
collapses, it might divert attention from the potential for a greater systemic collapse. Cf. Ruhl, supra 
note 211, at 468 (observing that small collapses can enhance the stability of complex systems ―the way 
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Nonetheless, there are specific areas in which regulation—or at least 
the threat of regulation—may well be necessary. Besides helping to 
resolve the collective-action problem discussed above,
300
 regulation can 
limit the extent to which an investor crisis of confidence causes markets to 
collapse by allowing portfolio disclosure as an alternative to marking-to-
market.
301
 Regulation can require credit-derivative transactions to be 
centrally registered so that market participants have more information 
about counterparty risk.
302
 Regulation also can speed the adoption of 
desirable market changes—for example, by eliminating the time needed 
for existing contracts to be replaced.
303
 Similarly, as the lessons of the 
subprime crisis fade in the memories of investors, regulation might be 
needed to limit undue future reliance on mark-to-model valuation
304
 and to 
ensure that investors give appropriate consideration to the need for 
independent third-party servicing
305
 and avoid inappropriate exclusive 
reliance upon credit ratings.
306
  
Because it is impossible to predict precisely how complexities might 
cause future evolving financial markets to fail, this Article offers no 
general prescriptive framework for regulating complexity per se. 
Nonetheless, the analysis has shown that regulators can generally mitigate 
the consequences of these failures by creating a market liquidity provider 
of last resort to decouple the risk of failures being systemically 
transmitted.
307
  
To the extent regulators consider promulgating any of these regulatory 
responses, they should note that complexity inserts a particular twist into 
the ongoing debate over whether regulation should be rules-based or 
principles-based. The argument in favor of regulation based on principles 
is that investment securities and financial markets constantly change, often 
unpredictably,
308
 and principles-based regulation is better suited to govern 
 
 
an area of tectonic activity might produce thousands of small tremors in order to avoid a severe 
earthquake‖); see generally BAK, supra note 211 (first positing how small collapses can enhance 
complex system stability).  
 300. See supra notes 293–94 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text (cautioning, however, that it is uncertain how 
useful this enhanced disclosure will prove). 
 303. See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra notes 285–86 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra notes 209–52 and accompanying text. 
 308. Cf. JOHNSON, JEFFERIES & HUI, supra note 123, at 3 (noting that fluctuations in evolving 
financial markets are difficult to model ex ante because previously observed statistical patterns do not 
always continue). 
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changing scenarios.
309
 Rules could be overly constraining or could simply 
lose their effectiveness.
310
 
Perhaps for this reason, the United Kingdom‘s Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) is moving to more of a principles-based approach.
311
 
Similarly, in the United States, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) is shifting GAAP from rules-based to more principles-based
312
 
and, to some extent, the emphasis of supervisory practices likewise 
appears to be shifting to a more principles-based approach.
313
  
Principles-based regulation, however, is most appropriate in an 
interpretive community in which ―the interpretive assumptions and 
procedures are so widely shared‖ by the regulator with the regulated parties 
(in our case, market participants) that the regulatory principles bear ―the 
same meaning for all.‖ 314 Without such shared assumptions and procedures, 
regulated parties will be unable to predict the consequences of their 
actions.
315
 Regulators need information from industry to remain relevant, 
just as industry needs information from regulators to remain compliant.
316
 
To this end, ―[m]any in the securities industry are calling for more 
principles-based regulation, linked with prudential oversight, to foster a 
consultative relationship between regulators and industry participants.‖317  
This suggests a potential dilemma: as investment securities and 
financial markets become increasingly internationalized and more 
 
 
 309. Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 
45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 2 n.8 (2008) (citing the SEC‘s recent establishment of a principles-based definition 
and disclosure requirements for asset-backed securities). 
 310. Id. at 60 (―Principles-based regulation and outcome-oriented regulation are responses to a 
visceral recognition that traditional, rule-oriented legal regimes are limited in their ability to deal with 
some broader organizational and cultural problems.‖). 
 311. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION, FOCUSING ON THE 
OUTCOMES THAT MATTER (Apr. 2007). 
 312. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Proposal for a Principles-Based Approach to U.S. 
Standard Setting (2002), http://www.fasb.org/proposals/principles-based_approach.pdf; Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, FASB Response to SEC Study on the Adoption of a Principles-Based 
Accounting System (2004), http://www.fasb.org/response_sec_study_july2004.pdf. 
 313. CRMPG III REPORT, supra note 54, at 137. 
 314. Julia Black, Using Rules Effectively, in REGULATION AND DEREGULATION 95, 100 (C. 
McCrudden ed., 1999). 
 315. Cf. Eilis Ferran, Professor of Co. and Secs. Law, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law, 
Comments at the University of Cambridge Conference on Principles v. Rules in Financial Regulation 
(Apr. 12, 2008) (expressing concern that, because its strategy is to enforce on the basis of principles 
alone, the FSA‘s assurance that firms will find it possible to predict the consequences of their actions 
will be ―just empty words‖). 
 316. E-mail from Cristie Ford, Assistant Professor, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law 
and author of New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 1 (2008), to the author (Apr. 19, 2008). 
 317. Elizabeth Derbes, The Subprime Crisis: U.S. Regulatory Responses and Lessons Learned 
¶ V.B.3 (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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complex, making principles-based regulation more attractive as a means to 
adapt given principles to different legal systems, it will become 
increasingly harder for regulators and market participants to act together as 
a community. That, in turn, will make principles-based regulation less 
effective. Regulators and market participants will have to remain 
cognizant of this limitation.  
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
As the subprime crisis has dramatically illustrated, complexity can be 
both beneficial and harmful. It is beneficial to the extent it adds efficiency 
and depth to financial markets and investments, such as by satisfying 
investor demand for securities that more closely meet their investment 
criteria and by facilitating the transfer of risk to those who prefer to hold 
it.
318
 But it is harmful to the extent it triggers the market failures described 
in this Article, ―mak[ing] crises inevitable.‖319 Ultimately it is necessary to 
find a balance through market adaptation and, when needed, regulation. 
This Article attempts to strike that balance. To this end, the Article first 
examines the ways in which complexity can cause markets to fail. For 
example, the complexities of the assets underlying investment securities 
and the means of originating those assets can lead to a failure of lending 
standards. The complexities of investment securities themselves can lead 
to a failure of investing standards and financial-market practices by 
impairing disclosure, obscuring the ability of market participants to see 
and judge consequences, and making financial markets more susceptible 
to financial contagion and to fraud. And the complexities of modern 
financial markets can exacerbate these market failures. Because these 
complexities have characteristics of complexities in engineering systems 
with nonlinear feedback and the failures themselves are characteristic of 
failures in those systems, the Article‘s analysis in part takes a law and 
engineering approach.  
That approach reveals that, just as there are no general laws for 
complexity, there are no general laws for regulating complexity. 
Complexity not only makes it impossible to predict how future financial 
crises will arise but also makes it more likely that regulation can lead to 
unintended, and often adverse, consequences. To help solve this regulatory 
dilemma, the Article proposes, among other things, that regulators create a 
market liquidity provider of last resort having the power to invest in 
 
 
 318. See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text. 
 319. BOOKSTABER, supra note 68, at 5. 
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securities of panicked markets or, as circumstances warrant, to hedge 
irrational elements of a market panic, thereby stimulating private 
investment in these securities.
320
 By so stabilizing market prices—
especially when those prices fall measurably below the intrinsic value of 
the securities, such as occurred in the subprime crisis
321—such a market 
liquidity provider would address the very consequences of market failure, 
dampening the over-amplification of marking-to-market that can lead to 
market collapse and reducing systemic risk by decoupling the chance that 
a failure in one market will trigger a failure in other markets.  
This solution takes inspiration from chaos theory and engineering 
design, which recognize that failures are almost inevitable in complex 
systems and that successful systems are those in which the consequences 
of a failure are limited. A market liquidity provider would work to limit 
the consequences of inevitable financial-market failures.  
This Article‘s conception of a market liquidity provider of last resort 
for financial markets goes substantially beyond the traditional focus of the 
U.S. Federal Reserve and foreign central banks as lenders of last resort to 
financial institutions. An additional focus on markets is needed to reflect 
the increasing shift of corporate financing from banks and other financial 
institutions to financial markets.
322
 Furthermore, because its mission is to 
correct market failure, a market liquidity provider should be able to invest 
profitably and still stabilize market prices.
323
 This should not create a 
taxpayer burden—and indeed a market liquidity provider could be largely 
privately funded. Any moral-hazard costs are likely to be minimal, or at 
least substantially lower than the moral-hazard costs created by a lender of 
last resort to institutions. Moreover, a market liquidity provider could even 
minimize the moral-hazard problem of governments being forced to prop 
up financial institutions that are deemed ―too big to fail.‖324 A market 
liquidity provider, if institutionalized, also should work more effectively 
than ad hoc market-liquidity approaches such as those attempted during 
 
 
 320. See supra notes 244–52 and accompanying text (discussing market failures that deter private 
investment and how hedging can restimulate that investment). 
 321. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text (examining how to measure when prices of 
securities fall below their intrinsic value). This Article indeed proposes, to minimize moral hazard, that 
a market liquidity provider of last resort should consider providing market liquidity only when it 
believes it can profit or at least break even. A market liquidity provider‘s mission should be solely to 
correct market failures. See supra notes 233–36 and accompanying text.  
 322. The Obama Administration‘s recently proposed revised financial bailout plan appears to 
recognize this reality. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (observing that government backing 
of the market for distressed MBS is an important element of this plan). 
 323. See supra notes 233–34 and 245–46 and accompanying text. 
 324. See supra notes 231–38 and accompanying text. 
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the subprime crisis. Market stabilization is much easier to achieve at the 
outset of a panic, before it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy cutting off 
credit and cratering the real economy.
325
  
The solutions offered by this Article, along with the ―law and 
engineering‖ approaches introduced, represent important first steps in 
helping to mitigate some of the harmful consequences of complexity 
without impairing the viability and importance of modern capital markets. 
Future study of complexity in financial markets may further benefit from 
ongoing engineering research, where a variety of modeling approaches are 
being employed to understand nonlinear interactive patterns.
326
 Any 
regulation based on that research should nonetheless be approached with 
caution. An analysis based on models is dependent on the underlying 
assumptions, and we do not yet know enough about financial markets to 
be certain of the assumptions.
327
  
 
 
 325. Contrast this Article‘s market-liquidity-provider concept with the ad hoc approaches over the 
past year of the Bush and Obama administrations. As discussed, the U.S. Treasury Department‘s 
proposal in September 2008 to use government money to purchase mortgage-backed securities issued 
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was the first attempt by government to stabilize markets by 
purchasing securities. See supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text. These purchases, however, did 
not address the much larger problem of mortgage-backed securities that are not already effectively 
government guaranteed. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 also contemplated 
government purchases of mortgage-backed securities, but its funds were used for other purposes. Ross 
Kerber & Robert Weisman, Bailout Retooled to Boost Lending, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13, 2008, at A1. 
The more recent Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, or TALF, contemplated investing 
government funds in certain consumer-asset-backed securities to reduce consumer financing costs. 
Scott Lanman & Sarah Mulholland, Fed May Need to Recast TALF on Commercial Real Estate 
(Update2), BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601068&sid= 
aeVjBaVLQNgY&refer=economy. And the Obama Administration presently appears to be 
considering an approach under which private investors purchase mortgage-backed securities with 
government hedging. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. Although these approaches are good 
beginnings, they may well be too little, too late. By waiting so long, it has become harder to stabilize 
markets because of the systemic impact of the subprime crisis. The real economy is shrinking and 
individuals are losing their jobs, making it more likely that obligors on assets backing even prime 
securities will default. 
 326. See, e.g., Burkett et al., supra note 115 (discussing research in ecosystem engineering that 
uses a variety of modeling approaches to understand nonlinear patterns). For example, scientists have 
been using models to analyze lake eutrophication, a process in which excess nutrients (such as 
phosphorous created by pollution) within the lake stimulate growth of aquatic plants, in turn causing 
rapid and cascading changes that ultimately deplete the lake‘s dissolved oxygen. Id. at 360. Traditional 
linear models can significantly overstate acceptable phosphorous levels because such models disregard 
nonlinearities such as threshold and feedback effects. Id. These are the same types of nonlinearities 
that exist in financial markets. 
 327. Cf. 10th William Taylor Memorial Lecture, Credit Markets and the Economic Crisis: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, available through Federal News 
Service (Oct. 16, 2008) or at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/LUDWIGSenateBankingHearing 
Record_TaylorLecture_Final_092508.pdf (Oct. 16, 2008) (statement of Eugene Ludwig, Chief 
Executive Officer, Promontory Financial Group) (stating that ―it is widely accepted‖ now that the 
subprime mortgage securitization models used by rating agencies and other market participants relied 
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on ―insufficient data and faulty assumptions‖); Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating 
Systemic Moral Hazard 23 (Oct. 30, 2008) (unpublished draft manuscript, on file with author) 
(observing that underlying the subprime financial crisis ―was an enormous [and unjustified] faith in the 
market‘s ability to analyze and measure risk‖). Investor panic leading to the subprime crisis may have 
been triggered, ironically, by incorrect modeling assumptions. Cf. supra notes 85–86 and 
accompanying text (observing that, in the subprime crisis, the assumptions underlying valuation 
models for CDO and ABS CDO securities turned out to be wrong, triggering investor panic). 
 
